On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution
must have
that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining
that we
are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally
unexplainable.
Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be
misleading. A
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person
supported by an
infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live
qualia. Then
the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia
have to
escape the pure third person type of explanations.
Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed
by a mere mortal?
It follows from comp, the classical definition of knowledge (the
agreement that the modal logic S4 defines an axiomatic of knowledge)
and then from Solovay theorem, and the fact that
(Bp <-> Bp & p) belongs to G* minus G.
It is explained in details in the long version "conscience et
mécanisme", and with less detail in the short Lille thesis (that you
have). It is also explained in the second part of sane04.
Formally a key text is the S4 provability chapter in Boolos 79 and 93,
and the articles referred too.
We can come back on this. It is the heart of the Arithmeticalization
of the UDA. It *is¨probably very naive, and I was sure this would be
refuted, but it is not, yet.
I think it can be understood by mere mortals, having enough times and
motivation.
For the sigma_1 restriction, you need also a good understanding around
Gödel and Mechanism. One of the best good is the book by Judson Webb.
Torkel Franzen's two books are quite good also. If you read the french
I summarize a big part of the literature on that in "conscience &
mécanisme".
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html
Bruno
A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an
explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem
impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate
that we
have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are
things
like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of
view, and
admit irreductible components.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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