On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>:

The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.

I have the same problem.

The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must have that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that we are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable.

Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. Then the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have to escape the pure third person type of explanations.

A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that we have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, and admit irreductible components.

Explaining why X is local to a certain perspective, or why X is irreducible does not explain why X is an aesthetic presence though.

Good. This means comp gives job. Nobody pretends that comp solves everything at once, and on the contrary, I specifically explains that he leads to new problem, like explaining the laws of physics from a statistic on computation-seen-from inside (to be short).

You can have numerical expressions which are irreducible and local to a machine without there being any such thing as flavor or color. As long as we are saying that both qualia and quanta are real, I don't see any advantage of making qualia supervene on quanta instead of the other way around, especially when we can understand that the nature of counting is to create figurative reductions which are nameless and homeless.

It is easier to explain something immaterial from something immaterial, than to explain something immaterial from primary matter, which is a quite speculative notion (nobody has ever provided any evidence for it, except a niave extrapolation from our familiarity with the neighborhood).

We can't turn a wavelength into a color without color vision and real illumination,

No doubt.

but we can turn color into a wavelength simply by discarding all of the actual color experience and looking at general patterns within optics analytically (abstractly).

Sure. Goethe said this already, but was wrong in deducing from this that Newton theory of color was wrong. It was just not handling the qualia aspect.

The irreducibility and 1p locality are hints, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient to access any specific qualia.

This is what you should justify.

I really don't think that I am missing something here. I can easily see it the other way around, I just don't think that it is true of the universe that we live in. Yes, it makes sense why a machine would not be able to tell that its experience is the result of a machine, but it doesn't make sense that Santa Claus would make that experience into tongues that taste that are different from eyes that see. All that matters is information transfer, so that difference would not engender any qualia, just clever addressing.

The modal intensional variant of the self-reference is not related to addressing. Even G ([]p) is not, or quite indirectly with some imagination, but the subject (S4Grz, []p & p)) blows up any addressing and naming issues in this context. No machines, like us, can give a description of "who they are".



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