On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>: >>> >>> >>> The comp assumption that computations have >>> >>> qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view. >>> >>> >>> I have the same problem. >>> >>> >>> The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More >>> exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must >>> have >>> that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that >>> we >>> are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable. >>> >>> Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be >>> misleading. A >>> computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by >>> an >>> infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. >>> Then >>> the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have to >>> escape the pure third person type of explanations. >> >> >> Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed >> by a mere mortal? > > > It follows from comp, the classical definition of knowledge (the agreement > that the modal logic S4 defines an axiomatic of knowledge) and then from > Solovay theorem, and the fact that > > (Bp <-> Bp & p) belongs to G* minus G. > > It is explained in details in the long version "conscience et mécanisme", > and with less detail in the short Lille thesis (that you have).
Ok, I'm preparing to start chapter 4, the movie graph argument. > It is also > explained in the second part of sane04. > > Formally a key text is the S4 provability chapter in Boolos 79 and 93, and > the articles referred too. > > We can come back on this. It is the heart of the Arithmeticalization of the > UDA. It *is¨probably very naive, and I was sure this would be refuted, but > it is not, yet. > > I think it can be understood by mere mortals, having enough times and > motivation. > > For the sigma_1 restriction, you need also a good understanding around Gödel > and Mechanism. One of the best good is the book by Judson Webb. Torkel > Franzen's two books are quite good also. If you read the french I summarize > a big part of the literature on that in "conscience & mécanisme". > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html Thanks! > > Bruno > > > >> >>> A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an >>> explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem >>> impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that >>> we >>> have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things >>> like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, >>> and >>> admit irreductible components. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
