On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>: >>> >>> >>> The comp assumption that computations have >>> >>> qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view. >>> >>> >>> I have the same problem. >>> >>> >>> The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More >>> exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must >>> have >>> that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that >>> we >>> are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable. >>> >>> Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be >>> misleading. A >>> computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by >>> an >>> infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. >>> Then >>> the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have to >>> escape the pure third person type of explanations. >> >> >> Thanks Bruno. Is there some formal proof of this? Can it be followed >> by a mere mortal? > > > It follows from comp, the classical definition of knowledge (the agreement > that the modal logic S4 defines an axiomatic of knowledge) and then from > Solovay theorem, and the fact that > > (Bp <-> Bp & p) belongs to G* minus G. > > It is explained in details in the long version "conscience et mécanisme", > and with less detail in the short Lille thesis (that you have).
Ok, I'm preparing to start chapter 4, the movie graph argument. > It is also > explained in the second part of sane04. > > Formally a key text is the S4 provability chapter in Boolos 79 and 93, and > the articles referred too. > > We can come back on this. It is the heart of the Arithmeticalization of the > UDA. It *is¨probably very naive, and I was sure this would be refuted, but > it is not, yet. > > I think it can be understood by mere mortals, having enough times and > motivation. > > For the sigma_1 restriction, you need also a good understanding around Gödel > and Mechanism. One of the best good is the book by Judson Webb. Torkel > Franzen's two books are quite good also. If you read the french I summarize > a big part of the literature on that in "conscience & mécanisme". > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/consciencemecanisme.html Thanks! > > Bruno > > > >> >>> A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an >>> explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem >>> impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that >>> we >>> have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things >>> like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, >>> and >>> admit irreductible components. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
