On 02 Oct 2013, at 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia, or to live qualia.
Why an infinity of computation?? That would preclude my building an
intelligent robot having qualia, since it's computations would
always be finite. And I doubt there is room in my head for infinite
computations - certainly not digital ones.
He is alluding to the universal dovetailer here, which contains an
infinite number of distinct computations that implement any given
conscious state.
However, it is not clear that it is necessary for it to be infinite -
in a nonrebust world that doesn't contain a UD, we still consider the
possbility of conscious computations in the MGA.
Yes, I know what he is alluding to. But if it really does take all
those infinite threads of computation to realize conscious states,
then I think that is the same as saying it takes the underlying
physics of a brain (or computer) to realize consciousness. But then
Bruno's program of explaining things from computation hasn't avoided
relying on the physical. ??
It just mean that human consciousness rely on the physical, but the
physical itself relies on relative statistics made on infinities of
computation + the self-referential logical view point. I gave the
equation; when on the left side you have something defining the
physical, and on the right side, purely logico-arithmetical notions.
I guess we will come back (as I have already given those equations)
soon or later. It is quite technical (as we can expected).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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