On 18 Oct 2013, at 04:48, chris peck wrote:
>>The uncertainty is objective
How can uncertainty be objective Bruno?
By being (provably) the same for all possible experimenters.
Examples: comp, QM.
Uncertainty is a predicate applicable to experiences only.
Yes, but it can be said objective if it is sharable by all observers.
This is what happens with the comp first person plural indeterminacy.
>> To insist, I use "first person indeterminacy" instead of
subjective indeterminacy
In step 3 you ask the reader to assess what he would 'feel' about
the chances of turning up in either location. When I use the term
'subjective certainty' by 'subjective' I mean to refer the to
feelings I would have, and by 'certainty' I mean that I would bet
100% on both outcomes.
In this case, the objective answer, sharable by all reasoners, is 50%.
The experience is subjective, but the indeterminacy bearing on the
experience is objective, 3p-provable, sharable, either by reasoning,
or by belonging to the multiplied population.
>> Chris, you have not answered the question where you are
duplicated into 2^(16180 * 10000) * (60 * 90) * 24...The question is
what do you expect to live as an experience, that you will certainly
have (as we assume comp).
My answer is that it would violate axioms you stipulate in COMP to
suggest that we should expect anything other than to see each film.
Like we can say living each life. But that's a 3-view on the 1-views,
and so evade the question of the relative prediction of the next
(after duplication) experiences.
In that case, an interview of some sample of observer will confirm
that they have seen only one precise movie, and most will assess it
was white noise/random.
Following Greaves I would add that my decision whether to let you do
this to me should be governed by my concern for all future mes. And
since a vast amount of them are going to sit infront of 90 minutes
of static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the ending just
static, I wouldn't let you do it to me.
I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I
would experience that exact fate.
That is why it is a thought experience. Your taste is simply not
relevant to figure what are the logical consequence of the axioms
chosen.
Best,
Bruno
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: For John Clark
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:04:27 +0000
Hi Jason
>> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person.
The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience
isn't indexical, its just me.
>> This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem
).
Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty'
does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me.
It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of
things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of
certainty/uncertainty.
>> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the
splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon
will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the
subjective uncertainty. Certainty only exists when talking about
the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external
impartial observer.
You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your
conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively
arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty
then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.
Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own
immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his
ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more
morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about
MWI and all outcomes obtaining.
>> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is
experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I".
Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense
than the one I have used? It seems identical to me.
>> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the
branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain
sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the
viewpoint of those being multiplied.
yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects.
>>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access
to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the
possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all
of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would
experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am
experiencing this one).
I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The
point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known
subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is
contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is
known before teleportation and after. Immediately after
teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer
sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and
sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before
teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the
responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell
on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation
have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If
i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then
if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet
that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet.
>> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending
you to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you
to both locations?
I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is
sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in
both locations.
>> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the
problems to be?
Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it.
regards.
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300
Subject: Re: For John Clark
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under
special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why
do we find ourselves in this particular "now"?
I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple
to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find
ourselves in all the nows.
Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now,
now?" - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it!
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