Hi Jason >> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person.
The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me. >> This page offers some examples of the distinction ( >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. >> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or >> prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what >> city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty. Certainty >> only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint >> of some external impartial observer. You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. >> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by >> someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I". Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me. >> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied. yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects. >>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be either heads or tails I win the bet. >> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you to one >> of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. >> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be? Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. regards. Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particular "now"? I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all the nows. Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now?" - which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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