On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 9:04 PM, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com>wrote:
> Hi Jason > * > > >> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. * > > The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't > indexical, its just me. > > Right but when you refer to "the experience" or "chris peck's experiences", that is speaking in the third person. > > *>> This page offers some examples of the distinction ( > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). * > > Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' > According to your usage, how is the meaning of "subjective certainty" different from just "certainty"? > does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It > certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am > definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. > Sure. > > > *>> Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the > splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be > observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective > uncertainty. Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of > others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer.* > > You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion > about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I > agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. > After the duplication there are two experiencers. Each is confronted with the impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would next have following the duplication. The knowledge that all experiences will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty. > > Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One > of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched > alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive > demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. > > > * >> I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is > experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the "I". * > > Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than > the one I have used? It seems identical to me. > According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing himself becoming one of the experiencers. Therefore it is not subjective in the sense that I use subjective, in which I mean you should literally imagine what it would be like to go into the duplicating chamber and be duplicated. Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I", but this does not remove the appearance of randomness as seen from the first person views, which is the main point of step 3: objectively deterministic processes which duplicate persons whose states diverge leads to the subjective feeling of unpredictability. This is no different than how Everett's many worlds explain the appearance of the unpredictable collapse. When I ask you what is the probability that your next experience will contain a block of U-238 in which all its atoms spontaneously decay in the next second, do you answer 100%? (because this does happen in some branches). > > > * >> The particular error that I am pointing out is that the branching > in MWI and the duplication in the UDA are in a certain sense equivalent and > result in similar consequences from the viewpoint of those being multiplied. > * > > yes. I agree they are equivolent in the relevant respects. > > > Okay nice. > * >>All the experiencers you might say she becomes only have access to > one outcome, and if she had bet on having (access to) all the possible > experiences, then she would find herself to be wrong (all of her copies > would conclude, oh I was wrong, I thought I would experience this outcome > with 100% probability but instead I am experiencing this one). * > > > I think Greaves point is more subtle than you give credit for. The point > is that at any point where all relevant facts are known subjective > uncertainty can not arise. I don't think that is contentious at all. There > is a difference though between what is known before teleportation and > after. Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because > you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been > duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. > Before teleportation there is no room for doubt. I often think the > responses I've had try to inject doubt from the future. They dwell on the > doubt that would be had once duplication and teleportation have taken > place. This is illegitimate in my view. Besides which, If i bet on being in > both Moscow and in Washington with certainty, then if I end up in either > place I win the bet. In the same way if I bet that a coin toss will be > either heads or tails I win the bet. > > I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem? I wonder what answer you would agree with: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem > > *>> So do you think you could tell whether a transporter was sending you > to one of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both > locations? * > > I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me > to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. > > Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), distinguish these two cases? > > *>> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems > to be?* > > Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. > Okay, that is fair. Jason > > regards. > > > ------------------------------ > Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14:04:58 +1300 > > Subject: Re: For John Clark > From: lizj...@gmail.com > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special > relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find > ourselves in this particular "now"? > > I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem is simple to > solve - we don't find ourselves in a particular now, find ourselves in all > the nows. > > Unless you mean "why do we find ourselves in this particular now, now?" - > which kind of answers itself, when you think about it! > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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