On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a good PI-reductionist Everettian, and she has followed what we’ve said so far. So she1 knows that she1 will see spin-up, and that she1 will see spin-down. There is nothing left for her to be uncertain about. What (to address Saunders’ question) should Alice1 expect to see? Here I invoke the following premise: whatever she1 knows she1 will see, she1 should expect (with certainty!) to see. So, she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-up, and she1 should (with certainty) expect to see spin-down. (Not that she1 should expect to see both: she1 should expect to see each.)"
But this is where the basis problem comes in. Why is the experience classical? Why doesn't Alice simply experience the superposition? Is there something about superpositions that makes them inherently inexperiential?
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