On 10/21/2013 12:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 1:02 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/20/2013 10:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 12:11 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 10/20/2013 8:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
If the first person views/memories are not integrated, they are not
experienced by the Jupiter brain, only instantiated, and it learns
nothing
of what it is like to *be* the beings it discovers.
?? How is an experience instantiated without being experienced? Sounds
like
double talk.
All experiences are experienced, but the question in this case is by whom?
Who can
rightfully be said to be an owner of that experience?
Makes not sense at all. If people are just sequences of experiences
(dispensing
with the physical as secondary) then there is no sense in asking who owns
an experience.
The same experience can be part of different sequences. E.g. (1, 6, 7, 19, 11) and (2,
3, 14, 19, 23) are two different sets, or sequences, (analogous to two different persons
by your definition), but they both contain the same number 19 (the same experience).
Thus the experience belongs can be said to be "owned" or "had" by more than one person.
So asking who owns an experience is equivalent to identifying the possible chains of
experience that contain a given experience. Let me know if this still makes no sense.
That's OK. But earlier you asked "who rightfully owned and experience", implying that
there was a unique owner of any given experience - which might be true, but is
incompatible with the idea of experiences as fundamental.
There are two minds in this case: There is the Jupiter brain's mind, and
there is
Brent Meeker's mind. The Jupiter brain might choose to simulate all of
Earth, and
thus it will instantiate yours, mind, and all earthlings' brains.
But now you're invoking brains to distinguish which mind is which. I'm
afraid your
theory is incoherent.
It is unfortunate that the term "Jupiter Brain" contains the word "brain" in it, but
treat the above cases of "Jupiter brain" as simply a label for something with
unfathomable computational resources and intelligence, the word "brain" is not relevant
to this discussion.
To use the sets of numbers analogy, a Jupiter brain that experiences other perspectives
is like a very large set of experiences.
If it's simply a set of experiences, then it can't "choose to simulate"
anything.
And so Brent Meeker will experience what it is like to be Brent Meeker.
But the
mind of the Jupiter brain will not be able to remember what it is like to
be Brent
Meeker without creating some kind of bridge to make Brent's memories and
experiences accessible to that mind.
Brent Meeker is always an owner of Brent Meeker's experiences, but there
may be
other entities who can rightfully be said to be owners of those
experiences, by
virtue of having memory of having been Brent Meeker, for example.
But that is beside the point, even if this brain was not
integrating the
experiences into a single view, and instead was morphing its brain
such
that it experiences one lifetime after, this activity creates a
chain of
connections that goes through all the observer's lifetimes it ever
experiences.
Why do experiences need some outside agent, "this brain" to integrate them?
They only need to be integrated if you want the experience to belong to
other minds.
I thought the idea was that experiences formed a chain by their
inherent content.
Think of a it like this:
Imagine a youtube of the future that enabled full sensory immersion. Now
there are
millions of experiences uploaded to this site, and each of the experiences
has been
viewed thousands of times, by any of millions of different real-world
observers.
Who are sitting in a big Cartesian theater.
Who then are the true owners of the experience? When the experience ends
the
playback, you don't know which of the thousands of viewers you will then
discover
yourself to be.
No, sensory immersion is not the same as experience immersion. Because of
my
memories and structure, experiences will be uniquely mine even though the
sensory
input is shared.
Imagine the downlaoded experiences encode your memories too, and when viewed restrict
the memories of the viewer to those of the uploader.
But then, relative to me, they would be no different than Jason Resch having the
experiences. Brent Meeker wouldn't be having them at all.
Brent
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