On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 5:49 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 10/21/2013 12:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 1:02 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  On 10/20/2013 10:51 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 12:11 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>> On 10/20/2013 8:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>> If the first person views/memories are not integrated, they are not
>>>> experienced by the Jupiter brain, only instantiated, and it learns nothing
>>>> of what it is like to *be* the beings it discovers.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  ?? How is an experience instantiated without being experienced? Sounds
>>> like double talk.
>>
>>
>>  All experiences are experienced, but the question in this case is by
>> whom?  Who can rightfully be said to be an owner of that experience?
>>
>>
>>  Makes not sense at all.  If people are just sequences of experiences
>> (dispensing with the physical as secondary) then there is no sense in
>> asking who owns an experience.
>>
>
>  The same experience can be part of different sequences.  E.g. (1, 6, 7,
> 19, 11) and (2, 3, 14, 19, 23) are two different sets, or sequences,
> (analogous to two different persons by your definition), but they both
> contain the same number 19 (the same experience).  Thus the experience
> belongs can be said to be "owned" or "had" by more than one person.  So
> asking who owns an experience is equivalent to identifying the possible
> chains of experience that contain a given experience.  Let me know if this
> still makes no sense.
>
>
> That's OK.  But earlier you asked "who rightfully owned and experience",
> implying that there was a unique owner of any given experience - which
> might be true, but is incompatible with the idea of experiences as
> fundamental.
>
>
I see.  I did not mean to imply that there could be only one owner (perhaps
a possessor is a better term?) of an experience.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  There are two minds in this case: There is the Jupiter brain's mind,
>> and there is Brent Meeker's mind.  The Jupiter brain might choose to
>> simulate all of Earth, and thus it will instantiate yours, mind, and all
>> earthlings' brains.
>>
>>
>>  But now you're invoking brains to distinguish which mind is which.  I'm
>> afraid your theory is incoherent.
>>
>
>  It is unfortunate that the term "Jupiter Brain" contains the word
> "brain" in it, but treat the above cases of "Jupiter brain" as simply a
> label for something with unfathomable computational resources and
> intelligence, the word "brain" is not relevant to this discussion.
>
>  To use the sets of numbers analogy, a Jupiter brain that experiences
> other perspectives is like a very large set of experiences.
>
>
> If it's simply a set of experiences, then it can't "choose to simulate"
> anything.
>
>

The mind has the tools available to generate any experience it wants,
somewhat like a lucid dream but one where you exercise complete control
over everything in that dream and thus can steer it wherever you want it to
go.


>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>   And so Brent Meeker will experience what it is like to be Brent
>> Meeker.  But the mind of the Jupiter brain will not be able to remember
>> what it is like to be Brent Meeker without creating some kind of bridge to
>> make Brent's memories and experiences accessible to that mind.
>>
>>  Brent Meeker is always an owner of Brent Meeker's experiences, but
>> there may be other entities who can rightfully be said to be owners of
>> those experiences, by virtue of having memory of having been Brent Meeker,
>> for example.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> But that is beside the point, even if this brain was not integrating
>>>> the experiences into a single view, and instead was morphing its brain such
>>>> that it experiences one lifetime after, this activity creates a chain of
>>>> connections that goes through all the observer's lifetimes it ever
>>>> experiences.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  Why do experiences need some outside agent, "this brain" to integrate
>>> them?
>>
>>
>>
>>  They only need to be integrated if you want the experience to belong to
>> other minds.
>>
>>
>>
>>> I thought the idea was that experiences formed a chain by their inherent
>>> content.
>>>
>>
>>  Think of a it like this:
>> Imagine a youtube of the future that enabled full sensory immersion. Now
>> there are millions of experiences uploaded to this site, and each of the
>> experiences has been viewed thousands of times, by any of millions of
>> different real-world observers.
>>
>>
>>  Who are sitting in a big Cartesian theater.
>>
>>
>>   Who then are the true owners of the experience?  When the experience
>> ends the playback, you don't know which of the thousands of viewers you
>> will then discover yourself to be.
>>
>>
>>  No, sensory immersion is not the same as experience immersion.  Because
>> of my memories and structure, experiences will be uniquely mine even though
>> the sensory input is shared.
>>
>
>  Imagine the downlaoded experiences encode your memories too, and when
> viewed restrict the memories of the viewer to those of the uploader.
>
>
> But then, relative to me, they would be no different than Jason Resch
> having the experiences.  Brent Meeker wouldn't be having them at all.
>

That is one way of looking at it, but what if prior to having the
experience, your brain morphs (continuously) into my brain before having
the experience, and then afterwards it morphs back in such a way that the
memory of the experience is maintained and integrated into Brent's brain?
Without this step, you would have no memory of the experience at all, and
it would make using this site rather pointless (I agree).

Jason

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