On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote: > OK. I should have said "suggests intuitively: or "intuitively suggests" > rather than merely "suggests that the universe is finite". However, your > insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. > > On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect >> intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. >> >> Quentin >> >> >> 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >>> >>> Intuition >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, "Richard Ruquist" <[email protected]> a écrit : >>>> > >>>> > John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or >>>> > stephen lin. Richard >>>> >>>> What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've >>>> found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? >>>> Quentin >>>> > >>>> > On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> 2013/10/31 John Clark <[email protected]> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux >>>> >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >> As I said before there is a profound difference between the >>>> >>>>> >> two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person >>>> >>>>> >> is seen by a >>>> >>>>> >> third party so it's easy to determine who "you" is and easy to >>>> >>>>> >> determine if >>>> >>>>> >> predictions about what "you" will see were right or wrong, but >>>> >>>>> >> with Bruno's >>>> >>>>> >> thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a >>>> >>>>> >> equal right to >>>> >>>>> >> the title "you" which means that the predictions about what "you" >>>> >>>>> >> will see >>>> >>>>> >> are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking >>>> >>>>> >> about >>>> >>>>> >> prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with >>>> >>>>> >> identity or >>>> >>>>> >> a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who "you" is, >>>> >>>>> >> it's the >>>> >>>>> >> only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people >>>> >>>>> >> clear as a >>>> >>>>> >> bell and both are called "you" and both saw different things, and >>>> >>>>> >> that makes >>>> >>>>> >> meaningless the question asked yesterday "what is the probability >>>> >>>>> >> "you" will >>>> >>>>> >> see X?". [...] The diary is useless because the diary was >>>> >>>>> >> written by "you" >>>> >>>>> >> and contains predictions about the further adventures of "you", >>>> >>>>> >> but now >>>> >>>>> >> there are 2 (or more) people with the title "you" and no way to >>>> >>>>> >> determine >>>> >>>>> >> which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless >>>> >>>>> >> because good >>>> >>>>> >> predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self >>>> >>>>> >> than bad >>>> >>>>> >> predictions. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> > So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are >>>> >>>> > not consistent >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been >>>> >>> having on this thread: >>>> >>> >>>> >> >>>> >> No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... >>>> >> >>>> >> Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger >>>> >> and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're >>>> >> just >>>> >> a troll. >>>> >> >>>> >> Quentin >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's >>>> >>> ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about >>>> >>> probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self >>>> >>> are >>>> >>> fundamentally different. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John >>>> >>> Clark's points. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults >>>> >>> directed at John Clark. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> Step 5: GOTO step 1. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> John k Clark >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>> -- >>>> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> >>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>> >>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> >>> [email protected]. >>>> >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> -- >>>> >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >> -- >>>> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> >> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> >> send an email to [email protected]. >>>> >> To post to this group, send email to >>>> >> [email protected]. >>>> >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > -- >>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> > Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> > an email to [email protected]. >>>> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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