Liz and Terren,

I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. 
After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to 
moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm 
still me by all reasonable definitions.

Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would 
no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course 

Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence 
exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product 
of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact 
copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant 
healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any 
difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an 
exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose 
'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not.

So what's the point? I forgot what it was...


On Thursday, January 9, 2014 5:01:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>  On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
> On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen < <javascript:>>wrote:
>> Terren, 
>>  I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's 
>> an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You 
>> can't come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically 
>> possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis.
>>   The no-cloning theorem means that if the correct substitution level is 
> the quantum level (or below), then it is physically impossible for us to 
> create a digital copy of a brain that creates the same state of 
> consciousness, in which case the above objection is valid.
> However, it isn't clear that this *is *the substitution level. Max 
> Tegmark has suggested that the brain is essentially a classical computer 
> (rather than quantum) which may in principle put the level above the 
> quantum. If he's right, then making a copy of a brain at the right level 
> becomes possible, albeit beyond present technology, and thought experiments 
> may legitimately use that idea (because it's possible in principle). 
> Personally I don't agree, I think that any copy made above the quantum 
> level isn't *guaranteed* to be the same, while a quantum recreation is 
> *guaranteed 
> by the laws of physics to be identical*. So assuming the substitution 
> level is the quantum level cuts out a host of possible objections.
> But a lot depends on what you mean by "the same". As Terren points out, no 
> one is exactly the same from minute-to-minute or day-to-day.  They are 
> similar enough that we denominate them the same person, even Gabby 
> Gifford is still "the same person" to a pretty good approximation.
> Brent

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