On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen <edgaro...@att.net> wrote:
> Liz and Terren,
> I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it.
> After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to
> moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm
> still me by all reasonable definitions.
> Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would
> no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course
> Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence
> exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product
> of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact
> copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant
> healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any
> difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an
> exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose
> 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not.
> So what's the point? I forgot what it was...
> The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle be
replaced with a copy, Bruno's "comp" arguments follow, with various
consequences (including reality being non-computable, I think - but check
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.