On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote: > Liz and Terren, > > I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it. > After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to > moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm > still me by all reasonable definitions. > > Therefore assuming an exact momentary but SEPARATE clone, that clone would > no doubt tell everyone it was me, but the still extant me would of course > disagree. > > Now assuming no 'ghost in the machine' or soul, for which no evidence > exists, and that our mental states and consciousness are entirely a product > of our biological bodies, then consider replacing various parts with exact > copies. If say a leg was replaced with an exact copy (assuming instant > healing to match the original) then I doubt 'I' would notice any > difference. So my brain was (could be) instantaneously replaced with an > exact copy with the exact neural circuitry and neural states then I suppose > 'I' would still think I was me. I don't see why not. > > So what's the point? I forgot what it was... > > The point is that once you agree that your brain could in principle be replaced with a copy, Bruno's "comp" arguments follow, with various consequences (including reality being non-computable, I think - but check with Bruno).
-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
