Lol! So that explains it. On Jan 10, 2014 8:56 PM, "LizR" <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 11 January 2014 14:02, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea >> (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be >> separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those >> worlds... or were you making a different point? >> > Brent seems to have a habit of sounding as though he's disagreeing when > what he says is really an addition to what you said, or even just a > rephrasing of it. But he looks like a nice bloke, so I'm sure it's all just > part of his eccentric charm :D > > "Hi, Brent, how are you today?" > > "I'm fine. But suppose I was to ask -- *how are you!?"* > > Terren >> On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >>> >>> >>> It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - >>> but only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren, experience one and >>> only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among >>> the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a >>> being in an alternative physics? Glak's consciousness selects a >>> unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak >>> experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I >>> experience. >>> >>> >>> But then if you ask, "Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?" >>> you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation >>> of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and >>> experience being Glak. This is like the "white rabbit problem", except in >>> the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps >>> saying must have a solution (if comp is true). >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
