Lol! So that explains it.
On Jan 10, 2014 8:56 PM, "LizR" <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 11 January 2014 14:02, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
>> (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
>> separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
>> worlds... or were you making a different point?
>>
> Brent seems to have a habit of sounding as though he's disagreeing when
> what he says is really an addition to what you said, or even just a
> rephrasing of it. But he looks like a nice bloke, so I'm sure it's all just
> part of his eccentric charm :D
>
> "Hi, Brent, how are you today?"
>
> "I'm fine. But suppose I was to ask -- *how are you!?"*
>
>  Terren
>> On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, "meekerdb" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
>>> but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and
>>> only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among
>>> the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
>>> being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
>>> unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
>>> experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
>>> experience.
>>>
>>>
>>> But then if you ask, "Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?"
>>> you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation
>>> of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and
>>> experience being Glak.  This is like the "white rabbit problem", except in
>>> the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
>>> saying must have a solution (if comp is true).
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
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