If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how it could be experienced as a single consciousness.
But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to go through my state? How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine you have two computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are identical in every way except that there is a difference in orientation of a single water molecule. Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity of computations going through my state? If so, it seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state, but that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet on. If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences between two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line, and how do you define it? You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the environment, where the environment could include other people and their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group together all computations whose differences don't impact the environment that I am consciously aware of. The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations can contribute, that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my experience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my house off the ground? Terren On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, "LizR" <[email protected]> wrote: > On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me, >> that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a single >> conscious experience. >> > If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences > apart. They would be "fungible", like the infinite identical copies that > exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just > be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number of times. I > guess this is the "capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle and "his > pigeon holes and flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the first is > too late". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if > millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and > others only appeared once. > > I think. > > (I'm assuming it's the "infinity" part that's the problem...) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
