On 11 January 2014 14:02, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote:
> Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea > (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be > separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those > worlds... or were you making a different point? > Brent seems to have a habit of sounding as though he's disagreeing when what he says is really an addition to what you said, or even just a rephrasing of it. But he looks like a nice bloke, so I'm sure it's all just part of his eccentric charm :D "Hi, Brent, how are you today?" "I'm fine. But suppose I was to ask -- *how are you!?"* Terren > On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> >> It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but >> only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren, experience one and only >> one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among the >> infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a >> being in an alternative physics? Glak's consciousness selects a >> unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak >> experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I >> experience. >> >> >> But then if you ask, "Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-versa?" >> you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable continuation >> of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics and >> experience being Glak. This is like the "white rabbit problem", except in >> the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps >> saying must have a solution (if comp is true). >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
