On 16 January 2014 08:40, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 1/15/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > And the answer is "yes, he would know that, but not immediately". > > So it would not change the indeterminacy, as he will not immediately see > that he is in a simulation, but, unless you intervene repeatedly on the > simulation, or unless you manipulate directly his mind, he can see that he > is in a simulation by comparing the comp physics ("in his head") and the > physics in the simulation. > The simulation is locally finite, and the comp-physics is necessarily > infinite (it emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on the whole UD*), so, soon > or later, he will bet that he is in a simulation (or that comp is wrong). > > But if it is sufficiently large he won't find it is finite. >
That was my objection too. Maybe the point is that the time he will take is proportional to the size? If you simulate the Hubble sphere, a simulated person won't find out for maybe 100 billion years. But can't the sim just be set up to always generate the person's surroundings, like in the Heinlein story about the guy who thinks he's paranoid? > > Also, I don't understand why finding his world is finite would imply comp > is wrong. In a finite world it seems it would be even easier to be sure of > saying "yes" to the doctor. I think you equivocate on "comp"; sometimes it > means that an artificial brain is possible other times it means that plus > the whole UDA. > I think - vaguely! - that this has something to do with the integers being infinite. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
