On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/16/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2014, at 20:40, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/15/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And the answer is "yes, he would know that, but not immediately".
So it would not change the indeterminacy, as he will not
immediately see that he is in a simulation, but, unless you
intervene repeatedly on the simulation, or unless you manipulate
directly his mind, he can see that he is in a simulation by
comparing the comp physics ("in his head") and the physics in the
simulation.
The simulation is locally finite, and the comp-physics is
necessarily infinite (it emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on the
whole UD*), so, soon or later, he will bet that he is in a
simulation (or that comp is wrong).
But if it is sufficiently large he won't find it is finite.
Hmm... OK. But he will soon or later. We are talking "in
principle", assuming the emulated person has all the time ...
Also, I don't understand why finding his world is finite
Finite or computable (Recursively enumerable).
would imply comp is wrong. In a finite world it seems it would be
even easier to be sure of saying "yes" to the doctor.
I don't know how you can know that the universe if finite. But comp
makes it non finite (and non computable), so if you have a good
reason to believe that the universe is finite, you have a good
reason to believe that comp is wrong, and to say "no" to the
doctor. That *is* counter-intuitive, but follow from step 7 and 8.
I think you equivocate on "comp"; sometimes it means that an
artificial brain is possible other times it means that plus the
whole UDA.
Comp is where UDA is valid. By comp, according to the degree of
understanding of the UD-Argument or the person I am speaking to,
just means the hypothesis, or its logical consequences.
But that comes from your assumption that belief=provable
UDA does not use that assumption.
And AUDA uses only the assumption that you believe in what PA can
prove, and that you are willing to be cautious on believing anything
more, as UDA suggests.
and that consciousness requires proving there are unprovable true
sentences.
Consciousness does not require that. Worms are conscious, and I doubt
they prove incompleteness. But as finite entities, incompleteness
applies to them, so they live or experience the incompleteness. It is
true for them, but worlds are not Löbian, and so they can't explicitly
explain this to themselves like a more introspective being (Löbian)
can do.
Those are both much more dubious than "an artificial neuron can
replace a biological one."
Yes, that is why I prove what I assert from that assumption, and
definition (which always simplify things).
Bruno
Brent
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