On 18 January 2014 11:16, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 5:04 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain >>>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not >>>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, >>>> >>> >>> Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-computable >>> physics in the brain. In fact physics is non-computable in general, BUT >>> the mind is computable, i.e. the level of substitution that preserves the >>> person is above the fundamental physics level. I actually think this last >>> is dubious. >>> >> >> I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum level. >> Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we can guarantee >> that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we could duplicate >> objects at that level, which we can't due to a fundamental principle...!) >> > > Liz, According to Bruno, if the subst level were above the quantum level, > then the constants of nature would be variable across > the universe; and that is the case according to astronomical observations > in the northern hemisphere (the Keck Telescope) compared to similar > measurements of the structure constant from the southern hemisphere. Does > your argument below mean that with the subst level above the quantum level, > comp is OK. Richard > >> >> Not so much my argument as my attempt to understand Brent's argument.
How does comp predict differences in constants? (I thought it predicted only one physics?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
