On 18 January 2014 11:16, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 5:04 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
>>>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
>>>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain,
>>> Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-computable
>>> physics in the brain.  In fact physics is non-computable in general, BUT
>>> the mind is computable, i.e. the level of substitution that preserves the
>>> person is above the fundamental physics level.  I actually think this last
>>> is dubious.
>> I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum level.
>> Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we can guarantee
>> that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we could duplicate
>> objects at that level, which we can't due to a fundamental principle...!)
> Liz, According to Bruno, if the subst level were above the quantum level,
> then the constants of nature would be variable across
> the universe; and that is the case according to astronomical observations
> in the northern hemisphere (the Keck Telescope) compared to similar
> measurements of the structure constant from the southern hemisphere. Does
> your argument below mean that with the subst level above the quantum level,
> comp is OK. Richard
>> Not so much my argument as my attempt to understand Brent's argument.

How does comp predict differences in constants? (I thought it predicted
only one physics?)

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