On 18 January 2014 13:48, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 1/17/2014 2:04 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain >>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not >>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, >>> >> >> Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is >> non-computable physics in the brain. In fact physics is non-computable in >> general, BUT the mind is computable, i.e. the level of substitution that >> preserves the person is above the fundamental physics level. I actually >> think this last is dubious. >> > > I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum level. > Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we can guarantee > that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we could duplicate > objects at that level, which we can't due to a fundamental principle...!) > > Actually Brent, your comment above reads like a refutation of comp, > which I suspect isn't the intention. > > Or is it? I read it as > > 1 Comp says fundamental physics is non-computable. > 2 Comp says the mind is the result of a computation. > 3 Hence if the subst level is at the level of fundamental physics, 2 can't > be correct > 4 I think it IS at the quantum level, so 2 is wrong, so comp is wrong - > QED :) > > > I don't think 2 is right. I think comp says that a mind is the result of > an infinite set of computations, which are not computable. But Bruno can >
Ah, yes, that's a good point. (And in fact I think comp says that there might be all sorts of subst levels going on in various computations, so 3 falls down too?) > correct me if I'm wrong. And similarly a physical object, like a neuron > or an artificial neuron, is also not computable. But then it may become a > question of what does it mean to 'preserve a person' when a person is just > an abstraction, a self-modeling piece of the world. How accurately does > the substitution have to be to 'preserve'? If I had a silicon based neuron > replacing one of my biologically based ones, it might serve fine in > transmitting neural pulses. But it might not respond to some hormones. It > wouldn't grow. I might respond very differently to a stray cosmic ray > particle. But I might still seem to be "me". > Or a damaged existing neuron, indeed. Well that is indeed the question, the unanswerable question I believe - what's the subst level? > However, surely comp says the mind is the result of computations in > Platonia, rather than in the brain? In fact it says that the brain doesn't > exist (along with everything else, apart from Platonia). > > But apparently the brain has a lot to do with those computations in > Platonia, c.f. anesthetic. Notice that I'm not a disciple of Platonia. > Me neither, I am agnostic - but within comp it is assumed, so while discussing comp we have to assume it (unless we're rejecting comp on that basis). But I can see that Platonia makes sense in that 17 does seem to be prime idependently of you and me and everyone else, which is (I'm told) enough for the whole shebang to come into some sort of existence. Anyway, I have no idea how the world is supposed to drop out of these infinite computations, anaesthetics and all. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.