>From what I've read so far, he (?) seems to have a lot of ontological assumptions built in. Unless I am misunderstanding what he is saying. Unfortunately I don't seem to be able to cut and paste from that document... But he says something like "Mathematical results...have an air of permanence..."
What? The last time I looked, Pythagoras' theorem still worked on a Euclidean plane, and I know of no reason to assume it ever won't. Similarly for 17 being prime etc etc. Sounds like he's trying to imply some unjustified *im*permanence there, for some reasons of his own. That isn't a promising start, imho! On 22 January 2014 15:37, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]>wrote: > Dear LizR, > > > On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 8:06 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 22 January 2014 11:38, Stephen Paul King >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Dear LizR, >>> >>> Plain English explanations are the problem: they carry a set of >>> ontological assumptions built it. Kauffman is challenging these assumptions >>> and thus as to use a mixture of poetry and math to explain and elaborate >>> the idea. >>> >> >> I know, I know ... I was a bit tongue in cheek - but even so, he *does*seem >> to be going out of his way to make what he is saying hard to follow. >> It is possible to explain a complex theory, and to point out / remove the >> assumptions, and still be intelligible to an audience which doesn't have a >> degree in advanced hand-waving. You don't get away from ontological >> assumptions by obfuscation, you just hide them! >> > > Not really. Lou does > not intentionally unfathomable explanation > . His ideas demand meditation, not quick jumps to comprehension. > > > >> Anyway, as I said, it seems to be suggesting something sensible, but I >> couldn't work out what it was, probably because I don't have time to give >> it the attention it deserves. So a plain English version (with ontological >> assumptions addressed in plain English) would be preferable. >> > > Try this: > http://www.gwu.edu/~rpsol/preconf/wmsci/kaufman2.pdf > > > >> >>> On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:35 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 21 January 2014 17:51, Stephen Paul King <[email protected] >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear LizR, >>>>> >>>>> Did the notion of an Eigenform, as defined, make sense to you? >>>>> >>>>> Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar >>>>> objects of our >>>>> existence can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviors >>>>> of the organism >>>>> that apparently create stable forms. These stabilities persist, for >>>>> that organism, as an >>>>> observing system. This is not to deny an underlying reality that is >>>>> the source of >>>>> objects, but rather to emphasize the role of process, and the role of >>>>> the organism in the >>>>> production of a living map, a map that is so sensitive that map and >>>>> territory are >>>>> conjoined. Von Foerster’s (1981a-d) book and papers were instrumental >>>>> in pioneering >>>>> the field of second-order cybernetics. >>>>> The notion of an eigenform is inextricably linked with second-order >>>>> cybernetics. >>>>> One starts on the road to such a concept as soon as one begins to >>>>> consider a pattern of >>>>> patterns, the form of form or the cybernetics of cybernetics. Such >>>>> concepts appear to >>>>> close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead outward. >>>>> They suggest >>>>> the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a >>>>> locus that might have >>>>> been within the system until the circular concept is called into >>>>> being. But then the >>>>> boundaries have turned inside out, and the inside is the outside. >>>>> Forms are created from the concatenation of operations upon themselves >>>>> and objects >>>>> are not objects at all, but rather indications of processes. Upon >>>>> encountering an object as >>>>> such a form of creation, you are compelled to ask: How is that object >>>>> created? How is it >>>>> designed? What do I do to produce it? What is the network of >>>>> productions? Where is the >>>>> home of that object? In what context does it exist? How am I involved >>>>> in its creation? >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The above hints at some sort of sense - it isn't something I could >>>> (quite) dismiss as postmodern nonsense, for example - but I think I can >>>> safely answer your question - "no, please resubmit in plain English!" >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>> [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Kindest Regards, >>> >>> Stephen Paul King >>> >>> Senior Researcher >>> >>> Mobile: (864) 567-3099 >>> >>> [email protected] >>> >>> http://www.provensecure.us/ >>> >>> >>> “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use >>> of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain >>> information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and >>> exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as >>> attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are >>> hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of >>> this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this >>> message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message >>> immediately.” >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > > Kindest Regards, > > Stephen Paul King > > Senior Researcher > > Mobile: (864) 567-3099 > > [email protected] > > http://www.provensecure.us/ > > > “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of > the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain > information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and > exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as > attorney work product. 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