On 23 January 2014 02:22, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]>wrote:
> Dear LizR, > On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 4:40 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 22 January 2014 17:35, Stephen Paul King >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Dear LizR, >>> >>> Yes, there are many ontological assumptions. Could you list a few that >>> seem obvious to you? It is not easy to cut and paste from a pdf. Can you >>> open it in the Chrome browser? >>> >>> In this ontology, all of the known math ideas still work, and those >>> that become known as discovered. The key is that they do not exist as >>> independent entities that are some how separable from the observer. >>> >> >> Well, there you have an assumption right there! (Did I mention >> Pythagoras? A million schoolchildren know that his theorem is "separable >> from the observer" because they had to be taught it.) >> > > Yes, it is an assumption. Are those schoolchildren observers? Do they > comprehend in some small way what a^2+b^2=c^2 represents? The point is that > a representation of a thing is not the thing unless it IS the thing. Is a > number merely a pattern of chalk on the blackboard? What about a different > pattern of dots on a piece of paper, could it represent the same referent? > Yes, it could. > Separability is a tricky and subtle concept... > Not from that example, that seems crystal clear! :-) > >> >>> Representations require presentations, they must be rendered by a >>> physical process to be perceived, understood, known, described, etc. >>> >> >> I this is considered in some way significant, I assume there is some >> confusion between the representation with the thing being represented. >> > > What is the relation between the two? My proposition is that there is a > relation between the category of Representations and the category of things > being represented (or "objects"). This relation is an isomorphism but not > always bijective. > >> >> >>> Knowledge is not considered to be some thing that is projected into >>> our minds by some mysterious process (see the allegory of the Cave). >>> >> >> This sounds like a straw man. Who has claimed such a thing? (apart from >> the afoirementioned schoolchildren, who would, I am sure, think knowledge >> was indeed being "projected into their minds by a mysterious process" !) >> > > Do you have a theory of knowledge that you use? Would this one be OK? > http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/russell1.htm > > Russell does not really answer the question... I am trying to wade through > the ambiguity and point out that what ever the means that knowledge comes > to pass there is both a physical process and a logical (mental?) process > and these are not one and the same process. > I would say the physical process instantiates the logical one. > >> I'm afraid I am generally suspicious of people whose main aim is to show >> that some other (often imaginary) view is wrong, rather than to attempt to >> demonstrate why their view is likely to be correct. >> > > I agree. I am trying exactly not to do that... > Good. We've had an example of that on this very forum recently, so I may be a bit predisposed to react against such... (or maybe doing the same thing myself, in a meta sort of way) > >> >>> It is the action of the brain to implement a mind that allows knowledge >>> to come into being. >>> >> >> So we assume, certainly. That doesn't stop us being able to hypothesise >> that there are things "out there", though, and arguably with a certain >> degree of success. >> >> >>> A related way of thinking is found here in a paper by Zurek on >>> decoherence: >>> >> >> I'll have a look at that, but I don't have time for reading endless >> papers so a precis is always appreciated! >> >>> >>> http://cds.cern.ch/record/640029/files/0308163.pdf >>> >> > My takeaway of the paper is that it argues for a Wheelerian > "participatory" universe concept. A plurality of observers and the > interactions amongst them constrain the content of observation. I see this > as a defining the process that creates realities; realities are not defined > by a priori fiat. > Well this is certainly *possible*. I mean, no logical contradiction springs to mind. But one needs (as with comp) to start with a theory of what an observer is, I imagine... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
