On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 3:01:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 03 Feb 2014, at 15:33, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 3, 2014 2:57:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 02 Feb 2014, at 19:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, February 2, 2014 4:36:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 01 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:16:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> "Appears" = output. >>>> >>>> >>>> "Appears to me" appears more like input to me. Output of of some >>>> universe? >>>> >>>> Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction, but yet >>>> they are relative. My output to you is your input, for example. They are >>>> indexicals too. >>>> >>> >>> Sure, but they are absolute within a given frame of reference. >>> >>> >>> That's my point. >>> >> >> It seemed like the point you were making is that appearances were inputs >> rather than outputs so it would agree with what you were saying earlier >> about the UD not having any outputs. I was making the point that in order >> for anything to have an input in a universe where the UD is calling the >> shots, then the UD has to be outputting computations to then non-UD (which >> receives them as inputs). >> >> >> Why? >> > > Because otherwise we would be controlling the UD as much as it controls us. > > > ? > > We have non control on the UD, like we have non control on the > distribution of primes. The UD and its work (UD*) is entirely determined by > the laws of addition and multiplication. >
By separating the UD from "its work" you are admitting that UD* is nothing other than the output of UD. When you ask why that has to be true, I can only say because if it were not then UD and UD* would be indiscernible by definition. Something has to = * and I am calling that 'output', since it is an externalization of UD laws....reflections of the fixed code book of laws are being put outside into a runtime of recombinations to be input and output through each other again and again. > > > > >> >> >> >> The larger point though is that input and output themselves (which I see >> as the sensory motive primitive that information exists *within*) is >> overlooked and taken for granted in comp. >> >> >> The input output relations are simulated within the activity of the UD. >> As I said the UD itself has no input and no outputs. >> >> What does a simulation do exactly, and how can there be any 'doing' which > isn't really an output? Can a simulation really exist other than as an > input which has been output from beyond the simulation? > > > The UD generates the programs in the order of their length, and in > alphabetical order when they have the same length. > Let us take the UD generating programs without input, like the program > computing functions on (all) fixed argument: > > P_0, P_1, P_2, .... > > The UD generates them > generates = output > , and dovetail on their finite piece of executions: > > P_0 1th step of execution > P_1 1th step of execution > P_0 2th step of execution > P_1 2th step of execution > P_2 1th step of execution > P_0 3th step of execution > P_1 3th step of execution > P_2 2th step of execution > P_3 1th step of execution > P_0 4th step of execution > P_1 4th step of execution > ... > execution = output + input of semaphore representing completion of previous output step. > > In that way, would some computation not halt, we will not been stuck in > that computations. In case each programs has one input, we would dovetail > on the inputs themselves, in the same manner (but actually that is not > necessary: it is equivalent to dovetail on a a one input-programs and its > input, as on the no-input-programs having fixed inputs. > > All those steps are intrinsically realized by the consequence of addition > and multiplication in arithmetic, so that if you are OK that "17 is prime" > is true independently of you, > It is true independently of me, but not true independently of sense. > then all the truth corresponding to each line in the dovetailing above is > realized in some true simple arithmetical sentences. This gives, inside > arithmetic, the entire dovetailing. > That seems contradictory. If the dovetailing is realized by grouping into sentences then realization is both inside and outside arithmetic...which would make it superfluous and unreal. > > You, as a Turing machine, have no means to distinguish if you are > supported by some "real computations", or by a computation existing in > arithmetic, and you next immediate states is determined by all computations > in the UD going through your actual states. That is why we will have to > recover the physical by a relative measure on all computations. > > OK? > You lost me there. I have no problem with physics being a measure on computations. That's the part we agree on. I only say that computation can only be a measure on sense, because if you can do computations without sense then you would, and there would be nothing to talk about. We wouldn't be here because the numbers would make sense already without our help. Computations would be initiated and completed in silent, intangible darkness, as they are in our minds and in the collections of superficially acquainted objects we call machines. > > > > > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> You cannot write a program which bypasses the need for inputs and >>> outputs by substituting them for a different kind of function. It goes back >>> to what I keep saying about not being able to substitute software for a >>> cell phone charger or a video monitor, or the difference between playing a >>> sport and playing a game which simulates a sport. >>> >>> >>> But then you are the one making an absolute difference here, which >>> contradicts you point above. >>> >> >> The difference is absolute when we are talking about the primordial case. >> The magnetic North pole of the compass actually points to the South pole of >> Earth's magnetic field, but if we are talking about the magnetic field, we >> do not say that the difference between North and South pole is relative. >> That's all academic though, my point was that Comp does not recognize its >> own North and South pole, which is part of why it cannot see that it is >> only an object within sense which reflects it rather than the source of >> sense. >> >> >> That is far to vague. >> > > I don't think that it is. If we are talking about magnetism in general, > then North and South poles are absolutes. If we are talking about a > particular magnet then they are relative in one sense and absolute in > another. Polarity itself is a relation which reflects the absolute. > > > May be, but all this does not prevent the UD to work without outputs, nor > inputs. > If the UD has no outputs, then there can be nothing but the UD. If the UD has no inputs, then it receives nothing from its *work. > > Now you can consider a UD as generating the set of lines above, and I will > not be sick if you call them outputs. That is not important and can be > considered as implementations details. This will not change the relative > measure, if it exists. > It's hugely important. If you recognize them as outputs, then you can potentially begin to acknowledge the significance of input and output as being more primitive than the possibility of computation, and then turn your model inside out so we have life, meaning, and authentic participation instead of sterility, simulation, and the uncanny valley of the dolls, er, suns in law ;) > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal >>>> machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all compute >>>> them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional CT can be >>>> derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines computes all >>>> functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many ways. >>>> >>> >>> How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output? >>> >>> >>> >>> Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's what >>> we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like getting a NAND >>> gate from a NOT and a AND gates. >>> >>> We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more >>> perverse, and usually this leads to interesting "fixed points", many simple >>> iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set illustrates this. >>> >>> But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the bottom >>> level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of you, then >>> arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself, independently of you. >>> >>> This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove but >>> follows from elementary computer science. >>> >> >> The arithmetic truth of 17 being prime doesn't do anything though. That >> fact needs to be used in the context of some processing of an input to >> produce an output. >> >> >> So you refer to extrinsic processing, but that contradicts your (correct) >>> phenomenological account of sense, >>> >> >> I'm not talking about my view of sense, I'm talking about my >> understanding of your view of the UD, arithmetic truth, and comp (which are >> not a part of my view at all). >> >> >> You can't criticize a theory by using another theory. That is called >> begging a question. >> > > How else can you criticize a theory? > > > > By working in that theory, and finding an internal contradiction or a > contradiction with some facts. > That won't work though, because information is an echo chamber. No theory can see beyond theory itself, unless that theory specifically intends to identify the limits of theory and transcend them by invitation to the thinker. There is no way to come to your senses by proving it logically, you have to open your eyes, literally, and see the light that is actually presented in your sensory experience. > > > > > >> >> >> >> and that jeopardize the possibility their primitiveness, or as David >>> shown, you are back to the POPJ. >>> >> >> In my view, all of arithmetic and processing is subordinate to the >> sensory-motive primitive (the silhouette of which could be translated as >> I/O in information-theoretic terms). >> >> >> That is a reiteration of your view, not a critic of another view. >> > > It's a criticism of views that assume that sensory-motive I/O phenomena > can be an exhaust of information processing. > > >> >> >> To me, everything is intrinsic, and extrinsicity is a perceptual >> contraction. >> >> >> You know that this is a consequence of comp, concerning the physical >> reality. But we have still an extrinsic general conception of the >> ontological reality (like arithmetic). Without it, your position is a form >> of solipsism, and of abandon of the idea of searching an explanation for >> sense. >> > > The primordial nature of sense IS the explanation for sense. > > > This like saying that the explanation of why we see a moon is that we see > that there is a moon. That sort of explanation is not satisfactory for me. > If something is primordial, how could it have an explanation? Whatever explains it would be more primitive. At least with sense, it follows that explanation itself would be unexplainable by definition. What does sense do? It makes plain. It presents what it hides. > > > > Without a sense primitive your position is a form of nilipsism, > > > It would be if sense was eliminated. > But not only sense is not eliminated, but it acquires some role and it > becomes justified by solid atemporal truth. > Why would there be a role for sense if it is produced by nonsense? > > > > and you abandon the idea of searching for an explanation for numbers. > > > Yes, but I know that there are none. > Hah. "This like saying that the explanation of why we see a moon is that we see that there is a moon. That sort of explanation is not satisfactory for me." If you can derive "the program P_789 has not stopped at his 34900067552231 > steps" from less than addition and multiplication (or less than combinator > abstraction and application, ...) then you show me the details on this. But > in fact I can prove to you that this is just impossible. > Combinator abstraction requires sense. You are beginning within the box of mathematical theory and then claiming that the fact that you refuse to get out of the box is theory that the box is a given. > The numbers remains mysterious, but that fact is not a mystery, and it > reflects the "well known" failure of logicism. We cannot derive the numbers > laws from something not Turing complete. > Sense is both Turing complete and trans-Turing complete. Input re-acquaints from the former to the latter, and output alienates from the latter to the former. Sense outputs heightened sensitivity insulated by decreased sensitivity, and then sensation removes the insulation/insensitivity/entropy and becomes re-acquainted with some level of the whole. It under-stands. A machine does not do that. Without the trans-Turing sense, the Turing complete UM is a repeater of external inputs for the purpose of satisfying low level motives for output. The outputs of the machine are not to satisfy our expectations, but to release its own physical tensions. > I use arithmetic, but the real conceptual assumption is the assumption > that there is at least one universal machine (that's a weakening of Church > thesis). > I see the universal machine as software. The hardware is sensory-motive experience, aka aesthetic re-acquaintance on multiple levels which transcend arithmetic or truth. > > > > > >> >> I don't get why POPJ would apply to MSR at all, it seems to me just a >> criticism (and a valid one) of functionalism and dualism. I use PIP which >> is a Tesselated or Ouroboran Monism. >> >> >> It does no work if your theory can't justify the appearance of the >> extrinsic. >> > > The extrinsic is justified as scaffolding and bricks are justified by the > Empire State building. > > > > That's a local metaphor, but comp explains where the brick and the > scaffolding appear. How do you justify that from sense only? > Because arithmetic is a kind of sense, and one which is specifically used to separate sensory experiences from each other. We don't lose arithmetic, it just becomes a kind of inverted mirror to the Absolute. It reflects one kind of sense which has come to be reserved for communication and control. Arithmetic is the commercialization of sense, an agoraphilic protocol built for interacting surfaces and step-divided templates. It is what allows the 3p to seem to splinter off from the absolute and give the impression of 1p by triangulation. Once we believe in the 3p view of 1p, (and it is important that we do, otherwise the world would be like watching a cartoon instead of living a life) then we tend to confuse the hugeness of the 3p relative to the smallness of our individual 1p with the hugeness of the p that has separated the 1 and the 3 in the first place. Arithmetic truth is the huge 3p + 3p reflected 1p, but sense is the p, containing infinitely more aesthetic possibilities. > > > > > >> But you are unclear about this, and I'm afraid you have to be unclear, >> because by starting from sense, you start from something which is >> notoriously unclear. >> > > Clarity is derived from the more primitive sense, which supplies the > possibility of clarity, unclarity, and the differential of qualities in > between. > > > Your notion of sense is too much fuzzy: it looks like it justifies > everything, but without explanation of how it does that, and why the > illusion of matter is persistent, etc. > It justifies everything because "how" is a concept within sense. It justifies the incompleteness of everything also, because sense is always limiting itself and forcing arithmetic games of nested frequency and duration. The universe is not a UD, not a multiverse, not a machine which tries and succeeds in doing every possible thing. Significance is generated by intentionally disallowing things as well, or miniaturizing and fictionalizing outcomes. > > > > > >> Then in some posts you continue to talk like if a physical universe >> exists. What is PIP? Comp is OK with Ouroboran Monism. After Gödel >> arithmetic instantiates clearly many form of such type of monism. >> > > PIP = Primordial Identity Pansensitivity > > http://multisenserealism.com/glossary/pansensitivity-pip-msr/ > > > I see prose, not a theory in the common sense of the term. > It is disturbing that you get negative results on other theories, when > starting from some unclear principles. > > Even if I could make sense of your "sense", which I honestly do not, I > could not make sense of why this distinguish a priori silicon and carbon > creatures. > Because silicon happens to have been disallowed for biological experience. Silicon and carbon are symbols and signs of the footprint of experiences, not the causes of them. I suggest that we stop thinking in terms of forms in space or functions in time and start thinking in terms of that which appreciates form and participates in function. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
