On 4 February 2014 13:19, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
Because silicon happens to have been disallowed for biological experience. > Silicon and carbon are symbols and signs of the footprint of experiences, > not the causes of them. I suggest that we stop thinking in terms of forms > in space or functions in time and start thinking in terms of that which > appreciates form and participates in function. Far be it from me to spoil the fun, but you could save yourself a lot of typing if you simply stated at the outset that you don't accept the premise that your consciousness would be invariant for a digital substitution of your brain. That is, in effect, the practical encapsulation of the rest of Bruno's argument, as he himself frequently reiterates. Silicon or carbon then have nothing to do with the matter (no play on words intended) as computation is a purely relational concept that is by definition invariant for any physical instantiation. What is remarkable about Bruno's argument is that he succeeds (in my view at least) in showing that for "physical instantiation" to make any sense it too must be derived from computation. Bruno frequently refers to your ideas as non-comp precisely because it seems clear that your would say no to the doctor. Be that as it may, I take it that this doesn't mean that you reject any lawful connection between whatever the brain might be said to do (at some level of analysis) and the conscious phenomena that appear to be correlated with it. It's just this kind of lawful connection that I've been asking you to elucidate in your theory. Even if we assume that sense is primitive, the appearances are still there to be saved and these appearances are not all of the same nature. One is hardly barred thereby from seeking ways of explicating how, for example, the apparent behaviour of our brains and bodies when we perceive could be lawfully correlated with direct perception. I'm sure that you've never intended to suggested that your theory merely entails that all such attempts are nugatory? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
