On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 9:19:51 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 4 February 2014 13:19, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:> > > wrote: > > Because silicon happens to have been disallowed for biological experience. >> Silicon and carbon are symbols and signs of the footprint of experiences, >> not the causes of them. I suggest that we stop thinking in terms of forms >> in space or functions in time and start thinking in terms of that which >> appreciates form and participates in function. > > > Far be it from me to spoil the fun, but you could save yourself a lot of > typing if you simply stated at the outset that you don't accept the premise > that your consciousness would be invariant for a digital substitution of > your brain. >
Why do you assume that I haven't? If you notice, I repeatedly say that it is not the logic of Comp that I reject, it is it's beginning assumptions. > That is, in effect, the practical encapsulation of the rest of Bruno's > argument, as he himself frequently reiterates. Silicon or carbon then have > nothing to do with the matter (no play on words intended) as computation is > a purely relational concept that is by definition invariant for any > physical instantiation. What is remarkable about Bruno's argument is that > he succeeds (in my view at least) in showing that for "physical > instantiation" to make any sense it too must be derived from computation. > I agree with Bruno's position on physics (although computation could be derived from physics in the same way), but I suggest for "computation" to make any sense it must be derived from aesthetic acquaintance, aka, sensory-motive participation. > > Bruno frequently refers to your ideas as non-comp precisely because it > seems clear that your would say no to the doctor. Be that as it may, I take > it that this doesn't mean that you reject any lawful connection between > whatever the brain might be said to do (at some level of analysis) and the > conscious phenomena that appear to be correlated with it. > Sure, I would not deny a sensible correlation, but there is no reason to suppose a direct translation. I can reduce red to a signal of invisible data, but that doesn't mean that invisible data can become acquainted with red on its own. > It's just this kind of lawful connection that I've been asking you to > elucidate in your theory. Even if we assume that sense is primitive, the > appearances are still there to be saved and these appearances are not all > of the same nature. One is hardly barred thereby from seeking ways of > explicating how, for example, the apparent behaviour of our brains and > bodies when we perceive could be lawfully correlated with direct > perception. I'm sure that you've never intended to suggested that your > theory merely entails that all such attempts are nugatory? > No, my theory only serves to expand the quantity and quality of correlations between not only brains and perception, but perception and language, language and ideas, ideas and subjects, etc. Craig > > David > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
