Hi Bruno >> ou cannot say something like this. It is unscientific in the extreme. You >> must say at which step rigor is lacking.
I think you're missing the fact that I was poking fun at a comment you made to Liz. Don't worry about it. >> You make vague negative proposition containing precise error in elementary >> statistics. It wouldn't be at all unusual for me to make mistakes in sums, but that 'error in elementary statistics' is not seen as one by prof's at Oxford, which gives me great confidence that Im on to something and that the error is yours . >> Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in H you >> predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that the prediction >> was wrong. The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: "what is the probability that either of your two successors sees M". Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: "what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see W)?" And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder who in fact is who. >> ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever listening to >> what the duplicated persons say. Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't make any difference whether you look at it from the objective or subjective view. The probabilities work out the same either way. And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons say' by adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly out of his body into a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on both W and M guys, dream their 1p views, fly back and integrate their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a hugely contorted confusion of the lot. >> So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to provide it. On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet understood it, less still rebutted it. All the best Chris. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 23:33:15 +0000 Hi Bruno >>Refuting means to the satisfaction of everyone. pfft! let me put it this way. There are a bunch of perspectives on subjective uncertainty available. Yours and Greave's to mention just two. They are mutually incompatible and neither of them has been refuted to the 'satisfaction of everyone'; consequently whether something has or hasn't been doesn't tells us much. Refuting something to the 'satisfaction of everyone' is extraordinarily rare in the scientific and philosophical community; less still the wider community. Has Astrology been refuted to the satisfaction of everyone? You're also aware, im sure, that even Darwin's theory, strictly speaking, has been refuted. That the theory of inheritance he employed was in conflict with his wider principles of selection. His theory was internally incoherent and he never spotted it. What does that tell us? That theories have extraordinary value even when they ought to have been 'refuted to the satisfaction of everyone'. This is a good and bad thing. Even if I hadn't refuted your theory to my own satisfaction, it wouldn't lead me to accept it. On the other hand, just because a theory has been (or ought to have been) refuted by everyone wouldn't lead me to reject it entirely either. It means I can have refuted your conclusions in step 3 to my own satisfaction, and still be interested in comp. Hurray! Surely that will make you happy? Have you ever read Putnam's 'on the corroboration of theories'? It was pivotal in my extremely stunted intellectual growth. In it he discusses the impossibility of ever refuting any theory. You're talking to someone who hasn't placed any currency in refutation for over twenty years. All the best Chris. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2014 19:32:32 +0100 On 06 Mar 2014, at 16:40, Gabriel Bodeen wrote:On Thursday, March 6, 2014 1:52:56 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Mar 2014, at 18:45, Gabriel Bodeen wrote: Brent was right but the explanation could use some examples to show you what's happening. The strangeness that you noticed occurs because you're looking at cases where the proportion is *exactly* 50%. binopdf(2,4,0.5)=0.375 binopdf(3,6,0.5)=0.3125 binopdf(4,8,0.5)=0.2374 binopdf(8,16,0.5)=0.1964 binopdf(1000,2000,0.5)=0.0178 binopdf(1e6,2e6,0.5)=0.0006 Instead let's look at cases which are in some range close to 50%. binocdf(5,8,0.5)-binocdf(3,8,0.5)=0.4922 binocdf(10,16,0.5)-binocdf(6,16,0.5)=0.6677 binocdf(520,1000,0.5)-binocdf(480,1000,0.5)=0.7939 binocdf(1001000,2e6,0.5)-binocdf(999000,2e6,0.5)=0.8427 binocdf(1000050000,2e9,0.5)-binocdf(999950000,2e9,0.5)=0.9747 Basically, as you flip a coin more and more times, you get a growing number of distinct proportions of heads and tails that can come up, so any exact proportion becomes less likely. But at the same time, as you flip the coin more and more times, the distribution of proportions starts to cluster more and more tightly around the expected value. So for tests when you do two million flips of a fair coin, only about 0.06% of the tests come up exactly 50% heads and 50% tails, but 84.27% of the tests come up between 49.95% and 50.05%. Good. So you agree with step 3? What about step 4? (*). I am interested to know. the FPI is just the elementary statistics of the "bernouilly épreuve" (in french statistics), and that is pretty obvious when you grasp the definitions given of 1p and 3p. Bruno (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Did you mean to address me, or did you mean to address Chris? I don't object to any step in UDA. It seems internally consistent and plausible to me. I'm unsure what level of confidence I would assign to it being actually true, although my gut feeling is in the vicinity of 25%. A reasoning is 100% valid, or invalid. Do you mean that the truth of the premise, comp, is in the vicinity of 25%. making perhaps its neoplatonist consequences in the vicinity of 25% ? I will make a confession: for me comp only oscillates between the false and the unbelievable. I have much formal logic to learn before I have any meaningful opinion about AUDA. OK. Fair enough to say. I often come back to zero, so you might enjoy a ride eventually :) Bruno -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
