On 07 Mar 2014, at 03:12, chris peck wrote:
>> Then you omit, like Clark, the simple and obvious fact that if in
H you predict P(M) = 1, then the guy in Moscow will understand that
the prediction was wrong.
The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed.
It is not, once you get the difference between the 1-view and the 3-
view, and keep in mind that we *assume* comp.
You ask H, 'what is the probability that you will see M' but this
question clearly presupposes the idea that there will be only one
unique successor of H.
This is trivially false, in the 3-1 description. Obviously there will
be, from the 3p view, two conscious survirvors whoi both are me (in
the usual sense that I am me, even after change like drinking a cup of
coffee, or taking a plane).
But by comp we know in advance (in Helsinki) that both first person
view of the survivors will be unique from their 1p pov.
So in Helsinki P("I will feel to be in only one city") = 1. Whoever I
will feel to be, I know that will be unique, and thus either W or M in
that protocol.
Do you agree with this? Do you agree that P("I will feel to be in only
one city") = 1, in step 3 protocol?
The only question that is really fitting in the experimental set up
is: "what is the probability that either of your two successors sees
M". Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p
then the correct question is: "what is the probability that (you in
M will see M) and (you in W will see W)?" And the answer to that
*is* simple and obvious. It is 1.
It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The
question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will
embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability
that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the
question,
Of course there is. We just know that with comp, the subject will not
feel any split or duplication, like in Everett.
and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants
begin to wonder who in fact is who.
Not when you use the 3 and 1 p nuances.
>> ike Clark, you confine yourself in the 3-1 views, without ever
listening to what the duplicated persons say.
Not at all. Its just that when you ask the right question it doesn't
make any difference whether you look at it from the objective or
subjective view. The probabilities work out the same either way.
And in fact, you can only 'listen to what the duplicated persons
say' by adopting some kind of 3p view in my opinion. H has to fly
out of his body into a birds eye view of the process, swoop down on
both W and M guys, dream their 1p views, fly back and integrate
their answers into his own sums. Whats that? 1-3-1-3-1-3-1p? If
we're going to be serious about 3-1 confusions then thats a hugely
contorted confusion of the lot.
>> So if you have a refutation of the point made, you have still to
provide it.
On the contrary, the refutation is there and you haven't yet
understood it, less still rebutted it.
tell me if you agree with this: If you are told, in H, (in the step 3
protocol) that you will be offered a cup of coffee in both W and M,
after the reconstitution. Do you agree that the probability("I will
drink a cup of coffee") is one?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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