On 7 March 2014 15:12, chris peck <chris_peck...@hotmail.com> wrote: > > The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is > the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes > the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only > question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: "what is the > probability that either of your two successors sees M". Or, if you want to > keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: > "what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see > W)?" And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. > > It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The > question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody > your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will > see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so > pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder > who in fact is who. >
I agree, given the context, the question is badly posed. However, I know what it means - the same as when you ask a scientist what is the probability that the Geiger counter will click in the next minute or the photon will go through the semi-silvered mirror, and they say "50%" even though they believe the MWI to be the correct interpretation of QM. It simply shows that given the assumptions, there is a first person indeterminacy in this situation, as Everett showed occurs in the MWI. That is all it shows, or needs to show... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
