On 7 March 2014 15:12, chris peck <[email protected]> wrote: > > The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is > the probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes > the idea that there will be only one unique successor of H. The only > question that is really fitting in the experimental set up is: "what is the > probability that either of your two successors sees M". Or, if you want to > keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then the correct question is: > "what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in W will see > W)?" And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1. > > It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The > question you phrase in fact implies that only one successor will embody > your sense of self, your 'I'ness. 'What is the probability that you will > see x': there is no recognition of duplication in the question, and so > pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to wonder > who in fact is who. >
I agree, given the context, the question is badly posed. However, I know what it means - the same as when you ask a scientist what is the probability that the Geiger counter will click in the next minute or the photon will go through the semi-silvered mirror, and they say "50%" even though they believe the MWI to be the correct interpretation of QM. It simply shows that given the assumptions, there is a first person indeterminacy in this situation, as Everett showed occurs in the MWI. That is all it shows, or needs to show... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
