On 3/6/2014 6:12 PM, chris peck wrote:
The question you pose to H in step 3 is badly formed. You ask H, 'what is the
probability that you will see M' but this question clearly presupposes the idea that
there will be only one unique successor of H. The only question that is really fitting
in the experimental set up is: "what is the probability that either of your two
successors sees M". Or, if you want to keep the questions phrased entirely in 1p then
the correct question is: "what is the probability that (you in M will see M) and (you in
W will see W)?" And the answer to that *is* simple and obvious. It is 1.
It seems to me this is at the crux of your argument with Clark. The question you phrase
in fact implies that only one successor will embody your sense of self, your 'I'ness.
'What is the probability that you will see x': there is no recognition of duplication in
the question, and so pronouns become altogether confusing and all participants begin to
wonder who in fact is who.
Yes, that's the same difficulty I had with the question. But it boils down to "Where will
you be?" It equivocates on "you", but that's the point, it's how it models Everett's
interpretation of QM.
Brent
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