On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 5:02:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Mar 2014, at 22:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, March 17, 2014 2:18:58 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 17 Mar 2014, at 17:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I >> say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that >> it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make >> them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response >> has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more >> advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except >> that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds >> of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no >> reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't >> produce computation. >> >> >> >> You go from a mirror to a configuration of mirror. I discussed that case. >> > > I am comparing the argument against zombies in comp with your argument > against the VCR. I see a double standard in comp which is very left wing in > presuming equality with living creatures, > > > ? > The "argument against zombies" presume equality for equal behavior. Your > "theory" single out the living. >
I don't single out the living, I discern between directly experienced histories and generic information. Our histories just so happen to follow the biological>zoological>anthropological branch, but I would not expect any kind of proprietary experience to be possible to emulate with generic information. > > but very right wing in presuming lower status for phenomena in which > computation is not apparent. > > > Behavior is not apparent. > Why not? > > > Because you believe that comp associate consciousness to machine/bodies, >> or to behavior, despite I have explained many times this is not what comp >> does. Consciousness is an attribute of a person, which own a body (well, >> infinitely many bodies). >> > > Then the explanatory gap is moved from mind/brain to person/computation, > with no improvement on bridging it. > > > On the contrary, computation handles both the first and third person > reference and this by using only the existing standard definition (of > knowledge, etc.). It lead to a mathematical theory of qualia, and of > quanta, 100% precise and this testable, and indeed partially tested. You > make affirmation just showing that you are not studying neither the posts > nor the papers. > The gap is still there. Math offers no first person theory of computation, nor third person theory of qualia, it only correlates the *idea* of first and third person perspectives (devoid of aesthetic content) with the idea of knowledge (again, semantically flattened into maps). > Then by assuming "sense", sorry, but that does just not make sense to me, >> unless you mean God, >> > > God has to make sense too. > > That is a reason more to not invoke "sense" in a scientific explanation. > You just make your case worst. > Science is tradition within sense. Sense is the reality. > > > Your "theory" seems to be only an opinion that another theory is foolish. >> > > Not at all. My attack on CTM is only part of MSR because MSR seeks to pick > up where CTM leaves off. The theory is about the relation of sense, > information, and physics, and about the spectrum of sense, not just about > pointing out the mistake of comp. > > > But you did not succeed in showing where CTM leaves of. You just beg the > question, or play with words. > CTM leaves off in failing to account for the presence of aesthetic qualities. It provides for no presence, no motivation, no proprietary novelty, etc. It takes sense for granted and mistakes its own shadow for the truth. > > You seem unable to doubt, as I have shown the remarkable coherence, with >> respect to comp, of your phenomenology, with the one made by the first >> person associated naturally to the machine, by applying the oldest >> definition of knowledge to machines, and it works thanks to a remarkable, >> and non obvious double phenomena: incompleteness and machine's >> understanding of incompleteness. >> > > This is one of your points that I find the most flawed, and I have > explained why many times. If we are both machines under comp, how can you > say that my view is consistent with the stereotypical machine views if your > view is not? > > > By the tension between []p and []p & p. It explains why the "comp truth" > is counter-intuitive fpr the machine. > If we have opposite intuitions, and we are both machines, how can you claim that comp would be counter-intuitive to one of us and not the other? > > > > > You would have to be placing yourself above me arbitrarily > > > No, I have just to assume comp. > But if comp is counter-intuitive to me, then it must be counter-intuitive to you - but clearly it is not counter-intuitive to you because you are able to assume comp. You are calling on a super-intuitive definition of your own mind which you are assuming that I am not using as well. I have assumed comp myself, but just as you transcended naive realism, I have transcended the sophisticated counter-realism that you are defending. I'm telling you that there's no way out from inside, you have to manually reclaim the immediacy and authenticity of sense in order to see the limits of comp. > > > and escaping your own 1p machine nature somehow. > > > Yes, we have to that, but that is the case when we attribute 1p to others. > Comp explains why the machine is wrong about comp, from the 1p view. And > the machine can understand, and find by itself, that explanation. > Why would the machine be wrong about comp first, but right about it later? > > > > > Why doesn't Bruno machine succumb to incompleteness and his understanding > of incompleteness? > > > > I do. That's why I insist that comp asks for a non trivial leap of faith, > and we are warned that comp might be refuted. Without the empirical > evidences for the quantum and MWI, I am not sure I would dare to defend the > study of comp. It *is* socking and counter-intuitive. > It's not shocking at all to me. For me it's old news. What is shocking and counter-intuitive is that the nature of consciousness is such that there is a very good reason why consciousness is forever incompatible with empirical evidence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
