On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor".
Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory-
just to indicate that this is an important question.
No problem: I love all questions :)
The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum
state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but
you have to detsroy "the original".
But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It
needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a
quite higher level than the quantum state.
You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but
it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which
is way above the quantum level defining the "material" book.
All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied,
without any information loss, to all participant to this forum.
Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even
if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total
quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7,
which does not use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-
preparation, which is done automatically by the arithmetical reality,
or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more
available except ... as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people
believe that the brain, although plausibly a quantum object, works at
a much higher level, so I don't insist so much on this, given that we
get a non-cloning result directly by comp.
OK?
Bruno
Richard
On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote:
Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the first-
person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could
you explain how?
In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in
staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide
to copy a piece of matter.
Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is
already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy
should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with
respect to some set of instruments.
Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer
description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own
substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of
subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent
of such details, and *you* diffuse on all the possible
"subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all universal machines are
somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the "length
of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How could
you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is not
a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily
fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can
see there is only an average of the many possible computations below
our (first person plural) substitution level.
OK?
Bruno
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