Then it is really a conjecture
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 5:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > 2014-03-25 22:34 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: > > >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bruno, >>>>> >>>>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>>>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>>>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>>>> >>>>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>>>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>>>> have to detsroy "the original". >>>>> >>>>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>>>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a >>>>> quite >>>>> higher level than the quantum state. >>>>> >>>>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but >>>>> it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is >>>>> way above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if >>>> it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be >>>> transmitted >>>> >>> >>> Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of >>> what is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level >>> is the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a >>> change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition >>> your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can >>> be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). >>> >> "Consciousness is Invariant at the Substitution level" >> Sounds like a theorem. Can you link me to its proof? >> > > It's a definition, it doesn't need a proof. > > Quentin > > >> Richard >> >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>>>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even >>>>> if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>>>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does >>>>> not >>>>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >>>>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>>>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >>>>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>>>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>>>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>>>> directly by comp. >>>>> >>>>> OK? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >>>> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >>>> Seems we have several levels: >>>> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >>>> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >>>> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >>>> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >>>> Richard >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Richard >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>>>>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could >>>>>> you >>>>>> explain how? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>>>>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to >>>>>> copy >>>>>> a piece of matter. >>>>>> >>>>>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is >>>>>> already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be >>>>>> defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some >>>>>> set >>>>>> of instruments. >>>>>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>>>>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>>>>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>>>>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and >>>>>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, >>>>>> all >>>>>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the >>>>>> 1p >>>>>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or >>>>>> computations). >>>>>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is >>>>>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>>>>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>>>>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our >>>>>> (first >>>>>> person plural) substitution level. >>>>>> >>>>>> OK? >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
