On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > > 2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: > > >> >> >> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>> >>> >>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>> >>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>> have to detsroy "the original". >>> >>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite >>> higher level than the quantum state. >>> >>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but it >>> is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way >>> above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>> >> >> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it >> is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted >> > > Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of what > is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level is > the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a > change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition > your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can > be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). > "Consciousness is Invariant at the Substitution level" Sounds like a theorem. Can you link me to its proof? Richard > > Quentin > > >> >>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>> >> >> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >> >> >>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if >>> our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not >>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>> directly by comp. >>> >>> OK? >>> >> >> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >> Seems we have several levels: >> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >> Richard >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you >>>> explain how? >>>> >>>> >>>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy >>>> a piece of matter. >>>> >>>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already >>>> not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by >>>> something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of >>>> instruments. >>>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and >>>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all >>>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p >>>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). >>>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is >>>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first >>>> person plural) substitution level. >>>> >>>> OK? >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
