2014-03-25 22:38 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: > Then it is really a conjecture > > It is a definition and by definition if comp is true, that level of description exists... (it can be as low as you want, as long as it is finite).
> > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 5:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> >> 2014-03-25 22:34 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: >> >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno, >>>>>> >>>>>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>>>>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>>>>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>>>>> >>>>>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>>>>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>>>>> have to detsroy "the original". >>>>>> >>>>>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>>>>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a >>>>>> quite >>>>>> higher level than the quantum state. >>>>>> >>>>>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but >>>>>> it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is >>>>>> way above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if >>>>> it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be >>>>> transmitted >>>>> >>>> >>>> Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of >>>> what is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level >>>> is the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a >>>> change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition >>>> your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can >>>> be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). >>>> >>> "Consciousness is Invariant at the Substitution level" >>> Sounds like a theorem. Can you link me to its proof? >>> >> >> It's a definition, it doesn't need a proof. >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> Richard >>> >>>> >>>> Quentin >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>>>>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even >>>>>> if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>>>>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does >>>>>> not >>>>>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, >>>>>> which >>>>>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>>>>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except >>>>>> ... >>>>>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>>>>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>>>>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>>>>> directly by comp. >>>>>> >>>>>> OK? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >>>>> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >>>>> Seems we have several levels: >>>>> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >>>>> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >>>>> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >>>>> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >>>>> Richard >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Richard >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>>>>>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> explain how? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>>>>>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to >>>>>>> copy >>>>>>> a piece of matter. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is >>>>>>> already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be >>>>>>> defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some >>>>>>> set >>>>>>> of instruments. >>>>>>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>>>>>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>>>>>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>>>>>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the >>>>>>> 1p >>>>>>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or >>>>>>> computations). >>>>>>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>>>>>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>>>>>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our >>>>>>> (first >>>>>>> person plural) substitution level. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> OK? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
