2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>: > > > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> Bruno, >> >> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >> just to indicate that this is an important question. >> >> >> No problem: I love all questions :) >> >> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >> have to detsroy "the original". >> >> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite >> higher level than the quantum state. >> >> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but it >> is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way >> above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >> > > Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it > is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted >
Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of what is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level is the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). Quentin > >> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >> > > Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. > > >> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if >> our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not >> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >> directly by comp. >> >> OK? >> > > Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated > if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. > Seems we have several levels: > the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the > substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. > The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. > They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. > Richard > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you >>> explain how? >>> >>> >>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy >>> a piece of matter. >>> >>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already >>> not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by >>> something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of >>> instruments. >>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and >>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all >>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p >>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). >>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is >>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our (first >>> person plural) substitution level. >>> >>> OK? >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
