Thanks Bruno. On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 4:34:43 PM UTC-5, yanniru wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:48 PM, Quentin Anciaux > <[email protected]<javascript:> > > wrote: > >> >> >> >> 2014-03-25 21:37 GMT+01:00 Richard Ruquist <[email protected]<javascript:> >> >: >> >> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal >>> <[email protected]<javascript:> >>> > wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>> >>>> Bruno, >>>> >>>> How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". >>>> Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- >>>> just to indicate that this is an important question. >>>> >>>> >>>> No problem: I love all questions :) >>>> >>>> The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum >>>> state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you >>>> have to detsroy "the original". >>>> >>>> But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It >>>> needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a >>>> quite >>>> higher level than the quantum state. >>>> >>>> You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but >>>> it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is >>>> way above the quantum level defining the "material" book. >>>> >>> >>> Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if >>> it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be >>> transmitted >>> >> >> Consciousness is always *at* the substitution level by definition of what >> is a "substitution level"... the definition of the substitution level is >> the level at which your consciousness is invariant (you don't feel a >> change) if implemented on a "digital brain"/computer... so by definition >> your consciousness is preserved at the substitution level as low it can >> be... (and it exists if computationalism is true...). >> > "Consciousness is Invariant at the Substitution level" > Sounds like a theorem. Can you link me to its proof? >
It is trivially a theorem of COMP, since the existence of such a substitution level is the COMP axiom itself. If COMP is true, then the substitution level is unknowable (although it can be honed in upon scientifically). > Richard > >> >> Quentin >> >> >>> >>>> All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, >>>> without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. >>>> >>> >>> Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. >>> >>> >>>> Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if >>>> our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum >>>> state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does >>>> not >>>> use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which >>>> is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal >>>> Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... >>>> as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, >>>> although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I >>>> don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result >>>> directly by comp. >>>> >>>> OK? >>>> >>> >>> Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated >>> if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. >>> Seems we have several levels: >>> the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the >>> substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. >>> The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. >>> They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. >>> Richard >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal >>>> <[email protected]<javascript:> >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >>>>> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could >>>>> you >>>>> explain how? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >>>>> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to >>>>> copy >>>>> a piece of matter. >>>>> >>>>> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is >>>>> already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be >>>>> defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some >>>>> set >>>>> of instruments. >>>>> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer >>>>> description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution >>>>> level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is >>>>> undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and >>>>> *you* diffuse on all the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, >>>>> all >>>>> universal machines are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the >>>>> 1p >>>>> for the "length of the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or >>>>> computations). >>>>> How could you clone that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is >>>>> not a real thing, but an information pattern, which becomes necessarily >>>>> fuzzy when we look at it below the substitution level. What we can see >>>>> there is only an average of the many possible computations below our >>>>> (first >>>>> person plural) substitution level. >>>>> >>>>> OK? >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>> [email protected]<javascript:> >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]<javascript:> >>>> . >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]<javascript:> >>>> . >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<javascript:> >>> . >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
