On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno, > > How does cloning differ from "asking the doctor". > Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- > just to indicate that this is an important question. > > > No problem: I love all questions :) > > The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum > state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you > have to detsroy "the original". > > But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It > needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite > higher level than the quantum state. > > You cannot clone this or that exemplary of "Alice in Wonderland", but it > is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way > above the quantum level defining the "material" book. > Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted > > All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, > without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. > Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. > Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if > our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum > state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not > use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which > is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal > Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... > as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, > although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I > don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result > directly by comp. > > OK? > Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. Seems we have several levels: the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. Richard > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > Richard > > > On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the >> first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you >> explain how? >> >> >> In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in >> staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy >> a piece of matter. >> >> Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already >> not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by >> something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of >> instruments. >> Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer description >> of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution level. At that >> level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is undetermined, as you >> comp state is no more dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on all >> the possible "subcomputations", where, by the FPI, all universal machines >> are somehow in competition (by the invariance of the 1p for the "length of >> the proof of the sigma_1 proposition, or computations). How could you clone >> that? We cannot clone an object, because an object is not a real thing, but >> an information pattern, which becomes necessarily fuzzy when we look at it >> below the substitution level. What we can see there is only an average of >> the many possible computations below our (first person plural) substitution >> level. >> >> OK? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Fabric of Alternate Reality" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/foar. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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