On 6/11/2014 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/10/2014 1:07 AM, LizR wrote:
On 10 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
Yeah that's pretty close, although I'd say consciousness just occurs at a
different level of description and is equally "real" at that level. The
second
law of thermodynamics is "real" at the level of thermodynamics, even though
it can
be seen as implied by statistical mechanics. It is more general than any
specific
statistical mechanics. I don't think p-zombies are possible, so
consciousness is
a necessary aspect of some kinds of physical processes.
So I guess that you think that consciousness is as real as the second law, which is
(as far as I know) an emergent property of the universe having been arranged in a
special way in the past (plus the laws of physics, although I imagine most varieties
of physics would give a version of the 2nd law, given a special arrangement of the
constituents of a universe).
So it isn't really, really, really real <mime-attachment.gif> .... but it /is/ a good
high level approximation for -- er -- something. <mime-attachment.gif>
I put "real" in scare quotes because ontologies are relative to theories, stories we
tell to describe the world. Since we don't even have a TOE, and if we did we couldn't
know it was right, we don't know what's "real".
Not if comp is correct, in which case a computationalist know an infinity of equivalent
TOE.
Sure, and if Christianity is correct you'll be punished for not worshipping
Yahwe.
he does not know them for sure, as he cannot know if comp is true, but those who
believes in comp, does know a TOE in the theaetetus sense, if comp is true.
Further more, I'm not even sure that the reductionist program of looking for what's
most fundamental (in a TOE) and reifying it is the right way to look at things. It
leads to making strings or numbers, which we never experience, "real" and everything we
experience (on which we base or theories) "illusory". I think this called the error of
the misplaced concrete.
In that case we are just no machine and should never accept an artificial brain (or UDA
is invalid of course).
That doesn't follow. The doctor can still make a prosthetic brain.
I don't think there is any choice in that matter, if we stick to rationalism and bet on
comp.
But there is a difference with physical reductionism, which eliminate persons. Comp
prevents such eliminative reductionism, and invite to listen to the machine, especially
on what the machine is cautiously mute. Incompleteness provides the 1p association to
the 3p machines. It is just a fact that []p & p behaves like a knower,
It's just a modal function. I don't see that it "knows" anything. ISTM you are leaping
the 3p/1p gap here in a way you consider illegitimate for physical theories.
Brent
and is (at the G* plane) the machine from the correct machine's view.
Bruno
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