On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 10:56 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 6/11/2014 1:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > I don't think there is any choice in that matter, if we stick to > rationalism and bet on comp. > > But there is a difference with physical reductionism, which eliminate > persons. Comp prevents such eliminative reductionism, and invite to listen > to the machine, especially on what the machine is cautiously mute. > Incompleteness provides the 1p association to the 3p machines. It is just a > fact that []p & p behaves like a knower, > > > It's just a modal function. I don't see that it "knows" anything. ISTM > you are leaping the 3p/1p gap here in a way you consider illegitimate for > physical theories. > If beings for argument's sake made of some matter in physical theories can know via exploring relations and patterns scientifically in 3p: why would the appropriate universal machines/numbers in comp ontology not be able to do the same? In both cases a leap of faith is required for some entity to assign to another such capacity. PGC > > Brent > > > and is (at the G* plane) the machine from the correct machine's view. > > Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
