On 7/24/2014 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jul 2014, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/23/2014 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2014 12:08 AM, Kim Jones wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 2:55 am, John Clark <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that allows
you to
say "I know"?
I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest anatomical
difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do know one thing for certain,
whatever part it is if it evolved then it effects behavior; and if it effects
behavior then the Turing Test works for consciousness and not just intelligence.
John K Clark
Are you saying that there is no consciousness without intelligence? I believe (up to
here at least) consciousness can exist minus intelligence.
Also, many things going on in the brain affect behaviour without necessarily having
any impact on consciousness at all.
I don't think the ability to say "I know (or believe) I am awake" has anything to do
with intelligence. But it does require consciousness (even if asleep and dreaming
that you said that.)
What I am driving at is that it is vaguely impossible to understand anything 1p in a
3p manner.
I think that is based on an unexamined idea of "understand". Suppose I could monitor
your brain with a super-fMRI and after long experimentation and mapping I could 'see'
every thought, including distinguishing which were conscious and which weren't. And
suppose using this information I could create a functional model of your brain so
that given the various inputs and environmental effects, I could predict exactly what
you would think, at least a few minutes in advance. And further, using this
knowledge, I could use electrostimulation to cause you to have specific thoughts.
And having attained this level of knowledge of many human brains, I can now make
brains to order having various characteristics: musical ability, empathy, humor,...
Now you will say I have not understood anything 1p (in fact my model predicts you
will), but I would reply, "OK, what else is there to understand?"
The difference between being the one knowing that he is in Washington and believing
that he has a copy in Moscow with being the one knowing that he is in Moscow and
believing that he has a copy in Washington.
That difference is easily modelled in the physics and the fact that one will see Moscow
and one will see Washington and each will remember Helsinki. I don't understand what
difference you think is not understood.
The description you give is pure 3p symmetrical. But now you have agreed that both
diaries will describe an asymmetrical event: one will contain I am in W and not in M,
and the other will contain "I am in M and not in W".
In the 3p view, the two diaries have not break the symmetry. But all diaries describes
the breaking of that symmetry.
So what? It is a result easily predicted by my physical model.
You miss the experience of the guys, and the fact that if you believe we are machine,
then we have to justify the stability of the observable from the solution of the measure
problem, on the sigma_1 sentences (with oracles)
No, you have leaped a big gap from "believe we are a machine" to "all the conclusions of
the UDA". I still don't know what you mean by "the experience of the guys". Ex hypothesi
my physical model predicts exactly what each one will do and say, including reports of
this experience and non-verbal signals. So I think you just saying I am "missing" the
"qualia" - but that's the part that I think it is unreasonable to ask for an explanation
of. In what terms can it be explained - I'd say none. And I don't think your explanation
in terms of computation, while different and interesting, is any more complete than my
physical one.
Brent
Once you take it into account you can, by some work, understand that such a "soul",
subject, person, is not that easily related to a physical process. With comp, it is
automatically related with infinitely computations, and that leads to interesting
problems in math suggestion new ways to conceive the things rationally.
You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold of relative
complexity, the lower level is not relevant for the description of the higher level.
It would be like asking "why Obama has been elected?", and getting back the answer:
everything followed the SWE.
That's David's "explanation=elimination", not mine.
OK. It is the point I agree with you, which indeed makes comp closer to "materialism
type of reductionism", except it reduce everything to your favorite universal number,
and then describe the infinitely complex relations that numbers can develop above their
substitution level, as from below they are confronted to a infinite sum of machine.
Then you miss the *key* thing (well for those interested in the mind-body problem)
that many people miss it; but not David. Nor the Ancients. It the mode of the subject,
the hero behind the mask. Who is he?
The "modern" seems to want to eliminate it.
I want to show that it has no answer in the terms it is asked.
(smile). Well, here I agree with David.
Honestly, I think that is a physicalist prejudice. I think you are just not really
interested in that subject (pun included).
Thanks to incompleteness, machines already get refractory to that elimination, and
known the 1p-3p difference.
Here, it is that once you take the higher level description into account, with their
relative independence, you have also to take into account their mode of relation with
themselves and truth and possibilities. As neither p, nor <>p follows from []p, by
incompleteness, important nuances follows in the way the machine can explore the
arithmetical reality.
It is non trivial and interesting because it reduces a part of the mind-body problem
into a "belief in body" problem, which can be translated into arithmetic, and tested
empirically. If that does not match, classical comp is false.
We can also compare the introspective discourse of the ideally correct universal
machine about it and It self, and Self, with the very diverse humans theologies. The
universal machine seems to agree with Lao-tseu that the wise stay mute. (making that
task not so easy, how to interview a mute machine?). Comp provides G, *and* G* to
solve that problem.
That pushes it off into the unprovable and therefore unknowable -
It is indeed unknowable in the Theaetetus sense, but that is what forces me to put
consciousness on the truth side, and not on the representation, the senseful experience
happens near the fixed point of the representations.
which is exactly my point that is nothing left to understand which is
understandable.
Theoretical computer science provides ladder and lattices to climb on the degrees of
unsolvability, and many other hierarchies. Theoretical "artificial" intelligence is
mainly the study of the transfinite fractals of the border of the universal machine
ignorance. It is the COBE of comp, for the measure problem.
I am an empiricist. The test is nature. I show that with comp, and the classical
definition, the "TOE" is in the mind of all universal machine, and how they can access
to its physics purely from inside.
It provides a different conception of reality capable of satisfying both the rationalist
and the mystic, even in the same person. A sort of piece treatise, between the body []p
and the soul []p & p.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
