On 24 Jul 2014, at 23:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/24/2014 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Jul 2014, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/23/2014 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 18:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2014 12:08 AM, Kim Jones wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 2:55 am, John Clark <[email protected]>
wrote:
> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain
that allows you to say "I know"?
I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the
biggest anatomical difference between a cat's brain and mine.
But I do know one thing for certain, whatever part it is if it
evolved then it effects behavior; and if it effects behavior
then the Turing Test works for consciousness and not just
intelligence.
John K Clark
Are you saying that there is no consciousness without
intelligence? I believe (up to here at least) consciousness can
exist minus intelligence.
Also, many things going on in the brain affect behaviour
without necessarily having any impact on consciousness at all.
I don't think the ability to say "I know (or believe) I am
awake" has anything to do with intelligence. But it does
require consciousness (even if asleep and dreaming that you
said that.)
What I am driving at is that it is vaguely impossible to
understand anything 1p in a 3p manner.
I think that is based on an unexamined idea of "understand".
Suppose I could monitor your brain with a super-fMRI and after
long experimentation and mapping I could 'see' every thought,
including distinguishing which were conscious and which
weren't. And suppose using this information I could create a
functional model of your brain so that given the various inputs
and environmental effects, I could predict exactly what you
would think, at least a few minutes in advance. And further,
using this knowledge, I could use electrostimulation to cause
you to have specific thoughts. And having attained this level
of knowledge of many human brains, I can now make brains to
order having various characteristics: musical ability, empathy,
humor,...
Now you will say I have not understood anything 1p (in fact my
model predicts you will), but I would reply, "OK, what else is
there to understand?"
The difference between being the one knowing that he is in
Washington and believing that he has a copy in Moscow with being
the one knowing that he is in Moscow and believing that he has a
copy in Washington.
That difference is easily modelled in the physics and the fact
that one will see Moscow and one will see Washington and each will
remember Helsinki. I don't understand what difference you think
is not understood.
The description you give is pure 3p symmetrical. But now you have
agreed that both diaries will describe an asymmetrical event: one
will contain I am in W and not in M, and the other will contain "I
am in M and not in W".
In the 3p view, the two diaries have not break the symmetry. But
all diaries describes the breaking of that symmetry.
So what? It is a result easily predicted by my physical model.
Well, all right, but then you are in the UDA train again, and you know
where it leads. You will need to invoke "infinities" (other that the
FPI one) to justify the link between the subject and the 3p objects
representing it.
You miss the experience of the guys, and the fact that if you
believe we are machine, then we have to justify the stability of
the observable from the solution of the measure problem, on the
sigma_1 sentences (with oracles)
No, you have leaped a big gap from "believe we are a machine" to
"all the conclusions of the UDA".
But that big gap is exactly what is detailed in the UDA. Or you
insinuate that there is something wrong, but since the time this is
discussed why don't you say so. I did answer your last remark on step
8. You seemed to grasp them. So to escape UDA, you need to abandon
comp or invoke a God-of-the-gap (with witch you can escape *any*
theory).
I still don't know what you mean by "the experience of the guys".
Ex hypothesi my physical model predicts exactly what each one will
do and say, including reports of this experience and non-verbal
signals. So I think you just saying I am "missing" the "qualia" -
but that's the part that I think it is unreasonable to ask for an
explanation of.
Why, when there is one, and which eventually does play a role in
explaining the quanta. Especially that the quanta have to be
particular sharable qualia for getting a first person plural notion
(confirmed by QM Everett).
Keep in mind that 1p singular and plural, and 3p, are notions defined
entirely by self-duplication. The first person plural is when
population of experiencers share "teleportation" boxes.
In what terms can it be explained - I'd say none. And I don't think
your explanation in terms of computation, while different and
interesting, is any more complete than my physical one.
Your physical explanation does not address the mind-body problem at
all. It postulates a physical reality and it postulate a 3p/1p link
incompatible with comp (and Everett), and this without distinguishing
the type of realities that we can access.
Bruno
Brent
Once you take it into account you can, by some work, understand
that such a "soul", subject, person, is not that easily related
to a physical process. With comp, it is automatically related
with infinitely computations, and that leads to interesting
problems in math suggestion new ways to conceive the things
rationally.
You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a
threshold of relative complexity, the lower level is not relevant
for the description of the higher level. It would be like asking
"why Obama has been elected?", and getting back the answer:
everything followed the SWE.
That's David's "explanation=elimination", not mine.
OK. It is the point I agree with you, which indeed makes comp
closer to "materialism type of reductionism", except it reduce
everything to your favorite universal number, and then describe the
infinitely complex relations that numbers can develop above their
substitution level, as from below they are confronted to a infinite
sum of machine.
Then you miss the *key* thing (well for those interested in the
mind-body problem) that many people miss it; but not David. Nor
the Ancients. It the mode of the subject, the hero behind the
mask. Who is he?
The "modern" seems to want to eliminate it.
I want to show that it has no answer in the terms it is asked.
(smile). Well, here I agree with David.
Honestly, I think that is a physicalist prejudice. I think you are
just not really interested in that subject (pun included).
Thanks to incompleteness, machines already get refractory to that
elimination, and known the 1p-3p difference.
Here, it is that once you take the higher level description into
account, with their relative independence, you have also to take
into account their mode of relation with themselves and truth and
possibilities. As neither p, nor <>p follows from []p, by
incompleteness, important nuances follows in the way the machine
can explore the arithmetical reality.
It is non trivial and interesting because it reduces a part of
the mind-body problem into a "belief in body" problem, which can
be translated into arithmetic, and tested empirically. If that
does not match, classical comp is false.
We can also compare the introspective discourse of the ideally
correct universal machine about it and It self, and Self, with
the very diverse humans theologies. The universal machine seems
to agree with Lao-tseu that the wise stay mute. (making that task
not so easy, how to interview a mute machine?). Comp provides G,
*and* G* to solve that problem.
That pushes it off into the unprovable and therefore unknowable -
It is indeed unknowable in the Theaetetus sense, but that is what
forces me to put consciousness on the truth side, and not on the
representation, the senseful experience happens near the fixed
point of the representations.
which is exactly my point that is nothing left to understand which
is understandable.
Theoretical computer science provides ladder and lattices to climb
on the degrees of unsolvability, and many other hierarchies.
Theoretical "artificial" intelligence is mainly the study of the
transfinite fractals of the border of the universal machine
ignorance. It is the COBE of comp, for the measure problem.
I am an empiricist. The test is nature. I show that with comp, and
the classical definition, the "TOE" is in the mind of all
universal machine, and how they can access to its physics purely
from inside.
It provides a different conception of reality capable of satisfying
both the rationalist and the mystic, even in the same person. A
sort of piece treatise, between the body []p and the soul []p & p.
Bruno
Brent
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