On 28 July 2014 19:16, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: This makes clearer my "apprehension" of Hoyle's heuristic, which might, if > taken too much seriously, be on the slope of a reductionism of something 1p > to something 3p. Perhaps. > > I do appreciate the picture and your attempt to use it for helping people > to better handle the CTM. >
Well, I trust I've never taken it more seriously than as a possibly helpful metaphor (in the spirit of Wittgensteins's ladders). But Hoyle's idea seems intrinsically 1p to me. It doesn't seem to depend on any 3p ontological assumption in particular. His universal knower possesses at the outset a panoptic overview that is conceived as continually splitting into discrete momentarily-relativised episodes. ISTM that according to Hoyle, in terms of each such episode (or consistent subjective extension) we should expect to find ourselves in precisely the state of relative existential indeterminacy you describe. I suppose the question is whether any immediate experience can plausibly be correlated with *some* discrete 3p configuration (even in the case that this may be any one of a fungible class), like a "time capsule". Perhaps this notion is itself incompatible with comp? Perhaps you could you elucidate further. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
