On 28 Jul 2014, at 13:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 July 2014 11:25, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Actually, comp is terrifying.
Rest assured, it terrifies me too. I think the terror stems, in a
sense, from the persistent (and I guess, at the terrestrial level,
essential) illusion of control. The idea that "I" could be
precipitated into any experience whatsoever with no say-so on "my"
part is what seems terrifying. Interestingly, I've sometimes
experienced a mild version of this fear immediately before falling
asleep. It's the fear of "losing control" to the dreaming state; a
kind of existential claustro (or agora) phobia. I've tried to
rationalise the terror induced by comp in various ways. For
starters, it's not a fear of something in prospect, because if comp
is true *it's true right now*.
My preferred intuition here, which (despite having been unsuccessful
in persuading Bruno) I still feel is not inconsistent with comp, is
Hoyle's universal person. It's perfectly possible to think of
experience in terms of an endless logical sequence of self-relating
observer moments (or experiential monads). Recall that Bruno
sometimes says that comp is a theory of reincarnation. If so, then
Hoyle's analogy serves as a kind of heuristic in terms of which we
are reincarnated afresh into personhood in each and every moment. To
put it another way, at the universal perspectival limit, each and
every moment is itself an experience of death and rebirth.
Now there's a thought.
We, the Löbian numbers have no problem with this. We said it out of
time: <>t -> <>[]f. That is part of our justifiable discourse: if we
have a consistent extension, that is if we don't belong to a cul-de-
sac world (dead) then the next world might be a cul-de-sac world, or
there is a cul-de-sac world in our vicinity. With comp, to be alive is
already necessarily a near death experience.
Now, there is always a danger in the use of metaphor like that if we
don't make clear the basic lexicon describing the representation of
one language into another, and the "subjective life" interpretation is
a bit of a treachery here, as the "subjective life" is indeed, in the
lexicon enforced by comp, related to the experience of the knower,
which does prove the formula above (the arithmetical formal second
incompleteness theorem). This 1p is the soul, and Socrates proof of
its immortality applies, the soul never actually met a cul-de-sac world.
This makes clearer my "apprehension" of Hoyle's heuristic, which
might, if taken too much seriously, be on the slope of a reductionism
of something 1p to something 3p. Perhaps.
I do appreciate the picture and your attempt to use it for helping
people to better handle the CTM.
Bruno
David
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