On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person
after-experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of
symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow
and
one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were
symmetrical there would only be one person regardless of how
many
bodies there were; there needs to be a break in symmetry for the
concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are two
different people because things are unsymmetrical, we both have
memories that the other does not; In the thought experiment
things
are a little more complicated because the Helsinki Man has no
memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does not, but
the
Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such
as the
memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience,
that a
person can exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the
conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from
brain activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a baby
becomes conscious. At that moment they form their first memory and
exist
as a conscious entity without any previous memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become
conscious?
What does "they" mean before consciousness?
The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..."
The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of
memory, then
any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion becoms a
bit moot...
Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not
just
come into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up
by a
combination of genetics and experiences.
In the sense of personality, I agree.
In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or
nothing
threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe I
remember
my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific claim, of
course
and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your own
introspection and
I can't complain if you arrive at different conclusions.
I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g.
my dog
is conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And
introspection is not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can
introspectively observed that you are introspectively observing...but
beyond
that you quickly run out of introspection. And the reason is easy to
see, we
cannot introspectively observe the firing of neurons or the diffusion
across
synapses.
I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that introspection
and
consciousness are the same thing.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find
this theory contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies
you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of
experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are
all the
same person but appear different due to experience is consistent with
the
experience of you being your own person separate from me.
Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is
redefined
to mean "different".
I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on "person".
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did
not
seem to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as
present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably
remember
being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of
memories. And
in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is
that,
if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style
duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with
empirical
experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one
that is
useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
