On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 1:12 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 8/4/2014 4:59 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 12:40 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 8/4/2014 4:23 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person >>>>>> after-experiences. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie. >>>>> >>>>> > In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry', >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and >>>>> one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were >>>>> symmetrical >>>>> there would only be one person regardless of how many bodies there were; >>>>> there needs to be a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" >>>>> to >>>>> be meaningful. You and I are two different people because things are >>>>> unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In the >>>>> thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the >>>>> Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does >>>>> not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such >>>>> as the memory of seeing Moscow. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a >>>>> person can exist independently of any memories. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the >>>> conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain >>>> activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a baby becomes >>>> conscious. At that moment they form their first memory and exist as a >>>> conscious entity without any previous memories. >>>> >>>> >>>> How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become >>>> conscious? >>>> >>> >>> What does "they" mean before consciousness? >>> >>> >>> The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..." >>> >>> >>> The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of >>> memory, then any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion >>> becoms a bit moot... >>> >>> >>>> Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not >>>> just come into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by >>>> a combination of genetics and experiences. >>>> >>> >>> In the sense of personality, I agree. >>> In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or >>> nothing threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe >>> I remember my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific >>> claim, of course and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your >>> own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at different >>> conclusions. >>> >>> >>> I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g. >>> my dog is conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And >>> introspection is not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can >>> introspectively observed that you are introspectively observing...but >>> beyond that you quickly run out of introspection. And the reason is easy >>> to see, we cannot introspectively observe the firing of neurons or the >>> diffusion across synapses. >>> >> >> I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that >> introspection and consciousness are the same thing. >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find >>>>> this theory contrary to experience. >>>>> >>>> >>>> It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies >>>> you-ness. >>>> >>>> >>>> ??? It doesn't imply sameness. >>>> >>> >>> I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of >>> experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all >>> the same person but appear different due to experience is consistent with >>> the experience of you being your own person separate from me. >>> >>> >>> Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is >>> redefined to mean "different". >>> >> >> I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on >> "person". >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not >>>>> seem to be the same person as when they could remember things. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as >>>> present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember >>>> being 5 year old Brent. >>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. >>>> And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno. >>>> >>> >>> That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble >>> is that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI >>> style duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with >>> empirical experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories. >>> >>> >>> Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one >>> that is useful to Depak Chopra. >>> >> >> Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem? >> >> >> Sure. That consciousness is an immaterial substance that separates >> from the body at death, and can in some cases travel instantaneously to >> distance places, see and hear things, and return to the body which it >> controls while the body is alive. Unfortunately all tests of this theory >> have failed to confirm it. >> > > All of the testable(?) extraordinary claims above are incidental to the > hard problem and just dressing up "dualism", which is non-testable. > (although logically refutable through the interface problem, so I'm not > sure it really counts as a theory to begin with) > > > Dualism simpliciter is non-testable (just like deism). But when it makes > specific claims and explanations like NDE's and remote viewing it becomes > testable. > The claims become testable, but this does not make dualism falsifiable because dualism does not imply NDE's and remote viewing. > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure >>> Alzheimers. >>> >> >> Not is a David Lynch movie useful to reduce obesity. What's your point >> exactly? >> >> >> That a good theory of consciousness should be useful for treating people >> with mental problems. >> > > Only if you already assume emergentism. Otherwise a good theory of brain > could be enough. > > > A good theory of the brain could be enough AND a good theory of > consciousness could be useful. I don't see it as XOR. > We agree, that was my point. A good theory of consciousness could be useful does not imply that a theory of consciousness that is not useful is bad. > The point is that a theory of consciousness that says any observable > behavior can go with any state of consciousness is NOT going to be useful. > It might not be useful to curing Alzheimers. That is maybe unfortunate, but we should not inject our preferences when looking for the truth right? On the other hand, you talk about "usefulness" in a very narrow sense. What makes life bearable in this weird reality we find ourselves in is very personal. We all have our different ways and different questions that we would like to answer, maybe. > It essentially cuts off any avenue of help. > No it doesn't! It doesn't follow from "a certain theory of consciousness provides no help for Alzheimer" that "there is no possibility of help for Alzheimer". Telmo. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
