On 07 Aug 2014, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did
not seem to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person
as present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can
probably remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of
memories. And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The
trouble is that, if we assume we are all the same person going
through MWI/FPI style duplications, we get a reality that is also
exactly consistent with empirical experience, including Alzheimers
and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but
one that is useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
Classical computationalism. The solution is that G* proves []p <->
[]p & p, but the machine cannot believe it, still less know it.
For the qualia, and perhaps the quanta, you need the weaker
versions: []p <-> []p & <>p & p, or [] & <>p <-> []p & <>p & p.
Ok, but is this falsifiable in the Popperian sense?
Yes. Such *classical* computationalism is refutable in the Popperian
sense. The FPI "probability one" has to be given, by UDA, by the
logics obeyed by the first person notions ([]p & p, []p & <>p, []p &
<>p & p), restricted to the sigma_1 sentences (the arithmetical
Universal Dovetailer). If the math did not show that quantum logic and
quantization appears there, classical comp would have been already
refuted (or QM is false, or we are in a simulation/dream, etc. That is
true for all empirical refutation, and Popper does not really push his
own logic enough far).
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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