On 09 Aug 2014, at 01:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/8/2014 11:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Aug 2014, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/8/2014 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2014, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly
did not seem to be the same person as when they could
remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same
person as present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you
can probably remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of
memories. And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The
trouble is that, if we assume we are all the same person going
through MWI/FPI style duplications, we get a reality that is
also exactly consistent with empirical experience, including
Alzheimers and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory,
but one that is useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
Classical computationalism. The solution is that G* proves []p <-
> []p & p, but the machine cannot believe it, still less know it.
For the qualia, and perhaps the quanta, you need the weaker
versions: []p <-> []p & <>p & p, or [] & <>p <-> []p & <>p & p.
Ok, but is this falsifiable in the Popperian sense?
Yes. Such *classical* computationalism is refutable in the
Popperian sense. The FPI "probability one" has to be given, by
UDA, by the logics obeyed by the first person notions ([]p & p,
[]p & <>p, []p & <>p & p), restricted to the sigma_1 sentences
(the arithmetical Universal Dovetailer). If the math did not show
that quantum logic and quantization appears there, classical comp
would have been already refuted (or QM is false, or we are in a
simulation/dream, etc. That is true for all empirical refutation,
and Popper does not really push his own logic enough far).
But is there not a world where classical physics holds?
If comp is true, there are none. But if the Planck constant is
geographical, there might be world where the quantum interference
might be so hidden that it looks *very* classical.
Comp predicts that classicality breaks below your substitution level.
But doesn't it assume that classicality applies AT your substitution
level?
Yes. Computation and computability theory, or arithmetic, are
classical theories (in the sense of the logician). We are neutral in
comp, if physics is classical or not. Only after the reversal we get
that physics cannot be classical in the Newton-Aristotelian sense.
The TOE is given by classical logic, + the axioms of RA. In that
theory we define the notions like computation, implementation,
universal machine, etc. We don't need to define the substitution level
in the math part, because we build or isolate in arithmetic, the
machine, and so it is implicit in the definition of the box "[]".
Bruno
Brent
There are dreams of classical physical realities, but they have not
the right statistics, and are negligible, like the white rabbits
(assuming we get the right measure from the material hypostases: a
lot of work needs to be pursue here).
Bruno
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