On 8/8/2014 11:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Aug 2014, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/8/2014 10:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2014, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly
did
not seem to be the same person as when they could remember
things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as
present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably
remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories.
And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is
that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI
style
duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with
empirical experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one
that
is useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
Classical computationalism. The solution is that G* proves []p <-> []p & p,
but
the machine cannot believe it, still less know it.
For the qualia, and perhaps the quanta, you need the weaker versions: []p
<-> []p
& <>p & p, or [] & <>p <-> []p & <>p & p.
Ok, but is this falsifiable in the Popperian sense?
Yes. Such *classical* computationalism is refutable in the Popperian sense. The FPI
"probability one" has to be given, by UDA, by the logics obeyed by the first person
notions ([]p & p, []p & <>p, []p & <>p & p), restricted to the sigma_1 sentences (the
arithmetical Universal Dovetailer). If the math did not show that quantum logic and
quantization appears there, classical comp would have been already refuted (or QM is
false, or we are in a simulation/dream, etc. That is true for all empirical
refutation, and Popper does not really push his own logic enough far).
But is there not a world where classical physics holds?
If comp is true, there are none. But if the Planck constant is geographical, there might
be world where the quantum interference might be so hidden that it looks *very* classical.
Comp predicts that classicality breaks below your substitution level.
But doesn't it assume that classicality applies AT your substitution level?
Brent
There are dreams of classical physical realities, but they have not the right
statistics, and are negligible, like the white rabbits (assuming we get the right
measure from the material hypostases: a lot of work needs to be pursue here).
Bruno
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