On 16 Oct 2014, at 17:20, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 3:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Educate yourself by reading the excellent book by Lawrence M
Krauss "A Universe From Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than
Nothing".
> It assumes still enough physicalism so that he put still some
magic in the brain.
After looking at what you say above I very much doubt you have read
the book by Krauss, or in fact read any book on cosmology written in
the last 300 years; books by Plato or Aristotle don't count.
You can sum up, if you have some argument, showing it solves the
computationalist FPI problems. But as you are stuck in step 3 of the
formulation of the problem, I am not sure you are arguing, but just
distracting.
>> You never said anything like that? On october 13 you said " But,
wait, we don't know if there *is* a physical world".
> In the context, it means a primary physical world. I insist enough
of that important distinction.
I know what I mean by "physical" but I don't know what you mean, but
whatever you mean it has to explain why engineers need to make a
"physical" computer to get any calculations done.
Physical means based on empirical laws, like F = gmM/r^2, or -ih/2pidf/
dt = Hf.
If we are machine we need some inconsitent induction power to justify
our consciousness can be correlated to that, unless this describes
well what emerge from the sum of all computations in arithmetic which
exist below our substitution level.
This generalize Everett from QM to arithmetic.
> It is a weak version of comp
I don't care, I have zero interest in "comp".
You still believe it enough to get up to step 2. And nobody
understands what is your problem in step 3.
Bruno
> that is it is implied by all version of comp
Well good for "comp".
> think at the step 3 of the UDA.
And I'm not interested in what steps the Universal Dance Association
recommends.
John K Clark
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