On 8 May 2015 at 18:24, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 08 May 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: > > Nicely summarised. I may have comments once I've had a chance to digest > your summary (and any subsequent comments). > > In the meantime, if you aren't familiar with Maudlin's "Olimpia" argument > that is also (possibly) relevant. It uses a similar form of argument to the > MGA to arrive at a different consclusion, namely that supervenience of > consciousness on a physical machine (brain, computer) isn't possible. > > > But that is the same conclusion than MGA. >
Sorry, yes, I was too hasty here. I gave what I believe to be the differences between your and Madlin's conclusions in another post: 4. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence consciousness isn't the result of computation (Maudlin) 5. it shows that physical supervenience is impossible, and hence, if consciousness *is* the result of computation, it can't be supported by a physical machine (Bruno) Post in haste, regret at leisure. I often dash off a post in a short break when I should really be doing something else. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
